FORDS: A model of de luxe exploitation (Or how to super-exploit and fiddle the The Transport and General Workers' Union have published details* of the Ford claim which inadvertently prove that the TGWU demand for a 50% increase to produce parity by a once-and-for-all increase is, in fact, a miserably inadequate wage claim, and that a reasonable claim, bearing in mind Fords" profit situation would be of the order of 200%.
The TWU argument also proves that the 50% demand is in no sense inflationary. It argues that an increase of 50% on the manua/ wages bill represents 30% on total workers earnings. As productivity is planned to increase in the next year by at least 10%, actual worker costs would rise by only 18% overall. Related to total expenditure, this produces a figure of 4%. As 1969 Ford prices were jacked up by more than the rise in costs in that vear it is argued that current prices need only be affected by a miserable 2%, which cannot possibly be considered inflationary. As prices are rising at the rate of at least 8% generally, it is therefore clear that the TGWU would have to bang in for a 200% increase before any arguments about inflation began to take effect as far as Fords is concerned. Similarly, had the TGWU asked for less than 26%, it could be argued that this would have a deflationary effect-and this is in fact a conclusion one can draw from the Ford E2 offer. At any rate, full settlement of the claim need only affect the new price vehicle by around £16 on an E800 vehicle, Government-imposed purchase tax is of course a main inflationary factor at work, although here again in the case of Fords at least, the main effect of an increase in prices is an increase in profits. Fords' 1970 retail prices are 9% or 10% above their 1968 level, about 2% of which should be ABOUT FORDS attributed to purchase tax increases and only 0.5% to wage increases. Of course, all these arguments tend to be unrelated to reality, but if the Ford bosses will use such methods of opposing increases, then they must expect to have their arguments turned against them. In fairness, it could be pointed out that the above arrangement is only valid so long as Ford's bought-in components do not rise in prices dramatically. But even here one can see that if 50% wage increases had a 2% effect on average on component suppliers it would still not wreck Ford (USA). So Fords' actual profits may be the final picture.
But Fords' opposition to the claim is again of the UK manufacturers and have one of the best profit records for a colonial outpost of the represents a return on the labour employed in Detroit parent company. In 1968 and 1969 gross trading profits per worker at Fords were in excess of £1,000 whereas the three main British-based rivals averaged around E400, Despite lower profits, these other companies pay between 5/- and 8/- an hour more than Fords. Similarly, whereas, for example, Ford Germany wage rates are 50% of the Detroit level, they are only 33% of that level in the UK.
Ford profits after tax for 1968 and 1969 were a cool 15%. Even the Government recommends that industrialists should seck rates of return on Profit from nowhere, for doing nothing. This new investment of around 6%% to 10%%. (In 1968, with 61,000 employees, Ford gross trading profits were E75 million. In 1969 with 65,000 employees, they were E70 million. The other three major British motor firms in 1969 had 256,000 employees and trading profits of E106 millioni. But in fact the true extent of Fords' profits is unknown. The performance of workers, or, if you like, on Ford products. Of the British company cannot be accurately con: course, it remains a fact that Ford's biggest sidered outside the context of the US parent.
A large part of the import export transactions of the Ford group are with other parts of the
Dear Comrades, of the Jewish question. Now when the forces of NOTES