The new coup by the officers who have just replaced Levingston with Lanusse came as a shock to no one in Argentina. For some time, all of the classical symptoms of an impending coup had been appearing more and more plainly, and open polemics were taking place between the leaders of the different tendencies. Fundamentally, the events of recent weeks are simply a confirmation of a crisis involving actual political and social disintegration of the system, which is incapable of projecting even minimally effective solutions to the most pressing problems or to produce a political leadership of any homogeneity or stability whatever.
With the Ongania military dictatorship, which attained power in 1966, the Argentine bourgeoisie was able to think for a short period that it bad entered a phase of relative stability. In fact, thanks to increased exploitation of the working class and pauperization of plebeian and petty-bourgeois strata, it was possible to achieve a certain economic recovery. At the same time, the maneuvers of he ultrabureaucratized trade unions, which in fact were collaborating with he regime, helped to bring about a tagnation in the mass struggle. The nterlude, however, was brief. In May 1969 large mobilizations by the workrs and students in Córdoba and Roario marked an abrupt turn. The evolutionary crisis shaking the Latin American continent was also envelopng Argentina.
The history of the past two years s the history of the Argentinian boureoisie's desperate attempts to find an Iternative solution. Its response to he 1969 upsurge was repression, but epression could not halt the mass movement. This is why the life of the evingston regime -which, from the tandpoint of its social content, was o different from that of Ongania -as distinguished by constant factionwarfare taking place, broadly peaking, between the advocates of a olicy of more determined repression nd the advocates of a "nationalistopulist" operation aimed at winning certain mass base for the regime nd assuring the collaboration of the raditional political forces. The polemis over political orientation doveailed, moreover, with those over ecoomic policy. The supporters of a tore "national" policy tinged with proctionism clashed with supporters of a iberal" policy, which in fact would romote the penetration of foreign apital (American, in the first inlance).
The question of whether a Peruvianyle solution should be expected in rgentina has in fact been discussed 1 Argentinian political circles. A few weeks ago, for example, exresident Frondizi made a prolonged isit to Peru, during which he voiced gnificant judgments. In the pettyourgeois left also there are currents at openly praise the regime of Vesco Alvarado (e.g., the Izquierda acional (Nationalist Left] of Abelar) Ramos, which publishes the arties of the capitulationist Ismael Frias, ho left the Fourth International in 65 along with Michel Pablo). For their part, the Argentinian revutionary Marxists consider a Peruan-style solution as a rather unlikely triant. In fact, Argentina differs ructurally from Peru, where both fore and after the 1968 coup the vian army, above all in a context of relative staghation of the mass movement, offered assurances for carrying out a cold transformation. There were many opportunities for keeping a check on the process from above, at least for one entire stage. But this is not the case for Argentina, where the army itself is deeply divided and -in the last analysis, the decisive factor - the masses have been on the offensive since 1969 In fact, a turn in the Argentinian political situation would be possible only on two conditions: (1) if the government made important economic concessions to the masses, thereby broadening the unions' margin for maneuver and refurbishing their credibility somewhat; (2) if an agreement were reached with the political formations believed to hold real influence over the electorate. This poses the problem of a compromise with Peronism. It could even, at last resort, raise the question of the exile returning from Madrid. But, in the specific case, in the context of militant mobilizations of the working class, of a radicalization of broad petty-bourgeois layers, of the development of new revolutionary vanguards (inside the Peronist movement as well), such operations would entail enormous dangers for the bourgeoisie. A process might be touched off that no one could control, and the system itself would be threatened with collapse. This is why it is easier for politicians or military of ficers playing political roles to talk about "national-popular," "constitutional," or "Peruvian" solutions than it is for them to indicate the precise forms by which such solutions could be implemented. This is why it is easier to promise elections as a basis for returning to "normality" than to set a date for voting and, most of all, stick to it.
During the last two months, student, popular. and working-class mobilizations have continued almost without letup. Sectors of the petty bourgeoisie and even the professionals have been involved. The epicenter was the large industrial city of Cordoba, where the workers staged several general strikes and organized big street demonstrations including thousands and even tens of thousands of participants. It was the working class in the big factories of the city that led a movement which, while stimulated by the continual deterioration in the standard of living (according to official figures prices rose 29.9 percent between February 1970 and February 1971), acquired the increasingly political content of a struggle against the military dictatorship and capitalist exploitation in general. Moreover, precisely in Córdoba, the process of the political ripening of the new working-class vanguard has gone the furthest. Militant unions like those in the automobile industry (SITRAC [Sindicato de Trabajadores de Concord - Concord Workers Union] and SITRAM (Sindicato de Trabajadores de Materfer - Materfer Union]) have opposed the old capitulationist, corrupt bureaucracy. Student youth have participated in the struggles of the Organizations devoted to armed struggle have won considerable influence and staged spectacular actions. The lessons of May 1969 and the latest repressions have made clear to thousands and tens of thousands of workers that class struggle in Arunquestionably been the Latin American country where urban guerrilla actions have developed most spectacularly (in certain aspects they have reached a higher level than in Uruguay itself. Five organizations have played a leading role - the FAP [Fuerzas Armadas Peronistas - Peronist Armed Forces], the FAR [Fuerzas Revolucionarias - Revolutionary neros, the FAL [Frente Armada de Liberación Armed Liberation Front), and the ERP [Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo - People's Revolutionary Army]. The first three groups claim to be Peronist (suffering deepgoing differences that simply reflect the differentiation in the Peronista movement whole. The FAL claims to be Marxist-Leninist (it arose partially out of the PCR [Partido Comunista Revolucionario - Revolutionary Communist party], which in turn was founded by youths who left the CP a few years ago). The ERP was created as the result of a decision by the PRT [Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores - Revolutionary Workers party], the Argentinian section of the Fourth International, which provides the political and organizational leadership. In the recent period, owing both to its own increase in strength and the difficulties experienced by the other organizations, the ERP has emerged as the most dynamic force, the one most capable of carrying out spectacular actions of the sort that can win very wide sympathies.
The strategic perspective the Argentine comrades are following is the one laid down by the Ninth World Congress of the Fourth Internationalelaborated and made more precise by the last two national congresses of the PRT - of a prolonged armed struggle, a revolutionary war, which might involve the intervention of the imperialists and thus could not be waged without profound ties to, and increasing participation by, the masses. The Argentinian comrades have no illusions that they can deal the class enemy a death blow through the activity of small vanguards, and they have rejected from the start foquista theories like those formulated in Régis Debray's celebrated pamphlet, which were more or less openly taken up by nuclei of revolutionary militants in Argentina and elsewhere. For the Argentinian revolutionists the battles of the last months are only the initial phase of the revolutionary war that is shaping up. Their actions represent only the beginning of a struggle that will of necessity be prolonged and very difficult. Their goal is to build up their forces, to train militants for combat, to win influence and sympathy by forms of armed propaganda, to establish the first direct links between armed struggle and the specific dynamic of workers' struggles.
These actions, which have come in rapid succession since the start of the year, especially in February and the first half of March, and which have made a very great impression on the daily and weekly bourgeois press, can be categorized as follows:.
a. Actions aimed at acquiring funds by expropriations carried out in the old Bolshevik tradition (the most spectacular stroke was the one in Córdoba which, according to the Argentinian press, brought its organizers 121.000.c. Actions designed to win th pathies of the most deprived by handing out food (meat, mil taken from big distributing firm d. Actions linked to workers gles (the most important so f the one carried out by an arn tachment which ivaded the FI tory in Córdoba and held a r there).
All these actions have effe achieved their objective of propaganda. At the present ti ERP is the best-known revolut organization and has won very sympathy —in some big plant From the technical point of vie the enemy has had to recogni the ERP has scored some points Any fear that such armed might isolate the organizatior the masses is absolutely withou dation in the Argentinian con day. The converse is true. The ing masses, the student mo activists, and the plebeian str the big cities warmly welcome tiatives of the revolutionary org tions. During a general strike i doba, the banners of the ERI greeted with strong applause thousands of demonstrators (e bourgeois press itself had to this). The same day, despite position of certain so-called tionary groups, including the pi nese, thousands of persons w the city prison, where the activ the armed organizations wer fined, and listened enthusiastic short speeches that some pri (belonging, according to the pi the Montoneros and the ERP ered from their cells. A few day 5,000 persons joined the funera cession of a young worker kil the police. The coffin was dra the flag of the ERP. Finally, n distribution could be carried th without the active participation population in the districts wher operations take place.
Let me repeat again. This i the initial phase of a very pro struggle. Our PRT comrades a fectly aware of this. They are also that future developments to a decisive extent on their to transform the sympathy a fluence they have won into so with the mass movement, on the ity to integrate armed action i dynamic of the struggles of the ing class and all the poor str their country. Their basic st does not prevent them, from exploiting the few opport that exist for legal or semilegal ty and will not prevent them exploiting more extensive possi that may be offered by conjur turns in the political situation which at present are improbal which cannot be absolutely exc In any case, the initiatives ou rades have taken in recent n are a milestone in the experie the armed struggle in Argentin will be analyzed with the grea terest by other revolutionary ments in Latin America.
This is why the United Secr of the Fourth International at i meeting drew "the attention of t ternational and of the revoluti workers' movement to the impo of the Argentinian events and tasks of international solidarity flow from it," sent its warmest
[The following statement was issued by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International April 19.] The government of Ceylon has declared a state of emergency and imposed a curfew throughout the island; they have suspended all democratic rights, imposed a strict press censorship, and arrested hundreds of militants of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (the People's Liberation Front-JVP). They have proscribed the JVP and have started shooting prisoners without trial.
The leaders of the coalition government have used their monopoly of the communication media to lie about the JVP, misrepresenting them as a "fascist" and rightwing organization. At the same time the government has not dared to inform the public that it has sought and received aid from the imperialist governments of the United States and Britain; that it is using Indian and Pakistani gunboats and helicopters; that it has expelled the North Korean diplomats from Ceylon.
The Bandaranaike popular front government came to power in May 1970 by promising the masses that it would usher in a "new era" and build a socialist Ceylon. One pro-Moscow Stalinist and three renegades of the reformist Lanka Sama Samaja party (LSSP) were included in the cabinet in order to bolster up the "socialist" image. However, despite all the rhetoric, the coalition government has demonstrated that its real role is to maintain capitalist property relations and preserve the imperialist stranglehold on the Ceylonese economy.
During its ten months in power, the coalition government increased the police force by 55 percent and set up an antirevolutionary committee in the army. "Socialism" of the Bandaranaike variety means the denial of such basic democratic rights as joining or torming trade union, as shown in the cases of the Velona factory, Dawasa Publishing House, and the Norwood Tea Estate. Workers who resort to strike action in struggling for union rights face bullets from the "people's" police.
The first budget of the coalition gov ernment submitted by N. M. Perera offered precious little to the masses. The budget demonstrated to the local and foreign capitalists that they need not have any fears or anxieties about the Bandaranaike government or lis "Marxist" ministers. Of course they explained that they had not forgotten about socialism, but right now it was not "practical" and socialism had to wait. Neither the "Save the country fund" nor the autumn budget could help the government avert the deep financial crisis it faced. Ceylon already owed the World Bank more than $50,000,000 and has been unable even to pay the interest on it. And yet it desperately needed more hard currency to pay for even the most essential imports. The World Bank would not grant any further loans until the government agreed to follow a course of "austerity." This meant the imposition of further burdens on the masses, such as withdrawal of the rice subsidy, pruning of social services, and the imposition of a wage freeze. The coalition government accepted the strictures. These developments have confirmed the position of the Lanka Sama Samaja party (Revolutionary) [LSSP(R)] that the coalition led by the Sri Lanka Freedom party SLFP is a capitalist government dependent on imperialism for its survival.
Under these conditions the government had no alternative but to impose more and more burdens on the masses. The masses rapidly became disillusioned with the coalition government. The government had failed even to project any solutions to the problems of rising prices and constant erosion of the masses' living standards. Unfortunately the coalition leaders, they now had to contend with another factor: the emergence of a revolutionary united front between the JVP and the LSSP(R), the Ceylon section of the Fourth International, and the newly formed revolutionary nucleus in the tea plantations, the Young Socialist Front. This united front rapidly gathered momentum, and the disillusioned masses were attracted to it. The Bandaranaike regime realized that the movement stood in the way of their "austerity" course.
On February 6, 10,000 people held a rally in Colombo sponsored by the JVP, the LSSP(R), and the Ceylon Mercantile Union CMUL the most important trade union of the Ceylonese urban working class. The gathering condemned setting up a U.S. imperialist base in the Indian Ocean, called for Ceylon to immediately leave the British Commonwealth, demanded nationalization of the banks, plantations. and foreign trade, and appealed for defense of the masses' standard of living by an all-out war on unemployment and rising prices.
Faced with this situation, the government decided to try to isolate this political movement and to destroy it before the masses mobilized. The immediate aim was to destroy the JP. After alerting the army and the police, the government staged a provocation on March 6. This provocation was a petrol bomb attack on the U.S. embassy by an unknown organization called the "Mao Youth Front." The government attributed this action to the JVP despite its denial of responsibility, and invoked special powers under the Publie Security Act. government then imposed emergency reg ulations, and began to arrest all known militants and leaders of the JVP.
The VP realized that they were faced with a critical situation. Rather than being decimated without a fight, they decided to resist the government repression. The clashes that followed between the JVP and the security forces were thus the direct consequence of the government action. The government miscalculated. They did not expect the JVP to resist. They did not realize that the JVP and its al lies would have such solid mass support.
The Fourth International recognizes that the struggle broke out before all the sections of the oppressed masses, particularly the urban and plantation workers and the Tamil minority, had become politically united so that they were in a position to meet the bourgeois government's provocation adequately and accounts with the capitalist state and The Fourth International calls upor olutionists everywhere to break the spiracy of silence covering the repre in Ceylon. It declares its full supp the repressed and persecuted Ceylor olutionary militants. It calls upon ti ternational working class, all wor class and anti-imperialist organiza to do everything possible to bloc shipment military supplies, an workers states to immediately stop ing military aid and equipment t Ceylon government, which is used to murder and terrorize its own p It calls upon the international wo class not to be taken in by the "left tenses of the Bandaranaike govern and to recognize the basic capitalis ture of the regime and proimperialis ture of its repression. The state of gency proclamation was approved parties in parliament, including the tionary United National party The Bandaranaike government oj Ceylon's airfields to the use of the stani government in transporting tr and supplies to suppress the rising peoples of East Bengal. Lieutenant onel Ranatunga of the Ceylon arm a press conference April 18, justifie execution of JVP prisoners without a by saying: "We have learnt too man sons from Vietnam and Malaysia must destroy them completely." ( The don Times, April 19, 1971.)
Indian workers and anti-imperialis itants: oppose Indira Gandhi's sha pact with the butcher Yahya Khar the British and U.S. imperialists in port of the Bandaranaike reghine's war against the Ceylon working c The peasant, and student youth!
Down with the traitorous Keunen N.M. Pereras, Colvin R. de. Silvas, Leslie Goonewardenes, who, like forerunner Noske, now arm reactio a bourgeois army murder revolutio support the murders or participate i suppression of the masses of their c try, and help suppress all democratic doms for the workers.
Freedom for Rohan Wijeweera an the other arrested JVP and revolutio leaders!
Not one dollar, not one gun t bourgeois army and state of Ceylon!
Long live the Ceylon socialist re tion.