it was not the so-called "Bloody Friday" bombings which prompted the invasion of the Republican Free Areas, but the incident in Lenadoon Avenue on 9 July. As we show elsewhere in this paper the casualties inflicted by the bombs in the centre of Belfast were created by the refusal of the security forces to act on warnings clearly given. "Bloody Friday" was a put-up job, designed to give a rationale for the invasion.
The real motivation behind the British switch in tactics is simple. The gains which Whitelaw was making through a policy of conciliating the Catholics were not substantial or rapid enough to offset the problems caused by the increasingly ominous threats of the UDA and the Ulster Vanguard. Having capitulated to the UDA in Lenadoon the British had lost most of the ground won in the softly softly days before and during the cease-fire. The level of concessions necessary to win back this ground would have been so unacceptable to the protestant extre mists as to make a military confrontation with at least a section of them almost inevitable.
THE ROAD TO LENADOON Whitelaw's dilemma was summed up very well by that master of logic J. Enoch Powell, M.P., in a speech made to the County Armagh Unionist Association on 28 July. According to an Irish Times report (29 July) Powell said:*It is not possible both to assure the people of Northern Ireland that their place in the United Kingdom will be maintained, and at the same time to have parleyed with the I.R.A., face to face, in the capital of the kingdom: or at the same time to bask in the adulation of an Opposition whose leader has been publicly complimented by the Government for proposals designed to produce a united Ireland in the measureable future or at the same time to proclaim the intention of finding a political solution' to which no avenue will be treated as barred and to which the agreement is sought of those who are fundamentally committed or at the same time to seek what, before Stormont was suspended, used to be called 'tripartite' understanding on Northern Ireland with the Republic, whose very Constitution asserts that Northern Ireland belongs to it already."
The protestant mobilisation which killed off the Whitelaw initiative stemmed inevitably from the sectarianism of the Northern Ireland state. However much a British government might want to change the nature orretorm some aspects of that state they will always be faced with the opposition of the majority of its inhabitants. and since they are not willing to pose even to themselves the question of the continued existence of the state they cannot solve the crisis of the Six Counties.
The UDA, temporarily mollified, will probably subside. Indeed the first fruits of Whitelaw's new initiative have been to open up the contradictions between the Ulster Vanguard and the UDA, which are a reflection of the differences between those who wish to maintain the protestant ascendancy at all costs, and those who wish to maintain the protestant ascendancy within the context of the Union with Britain. But protestant extremism remains as a road block to any progress in Ireland. In Lenadoon Avenue, the Provisionals manoeuvred Tho Rod Molo 7 Annuct 1077 Pana the British into a choice between taking on the UDA and bursting the bubble, or capitulating to their pressure. Predictably British imperialism lined up once more with Orange reaction, despite their long term desire to "normalise" sectarianism out of Six County politics From this capitulation the rest follows. It is not possible to give in to one side in the Six Counties without pushing hard against the other. The Provisionals having gained a new position of strength it was necessary for the British to attempt to gain the ascendancy over them in order to avoid being pushed against the UDA again. Since this could not be achieved politically the superior technical resources and firepower of the British Army had to be asserted. The invasion was not only in line with this, but it was a very substantial scrap which could be thrown to the wolves of the protestant right.
NO FAMOUS VICTORY The invasion was hardly a famous victory, and certainly not a military defeat for the IRA. The struggle may have been pushed back by the elimination of the Free Areas, but it will continue in other forms. The Free Areas were important to the military struggle but the IRA was able to carry out quite effective military action before they were set up, and will continue to do so. The Free Areas were politically important; they were the undeniable manifestation of the rejection of British rule by the catholic masses, and behind them the political consciousness of the masses was raised considerably. But that political consciousness will not be dismantled as easily as the barricades. In fact as the unpleasant facts of life under the heel of the British Army become evident it will be strengthened.
The most important aspect of the Free Areas was their potential role in the strategy of the Irish revolution. As exemplary pockets of popular control, they were capable of inspiring mass support on an all-Ireland basis. In confronting against Ulster being part of the United Kingdom, the problems of leading the masses the volunteers of the Republican Army and the other revolutionary elements learned important political lessons, which represented a qualitative break from the previous IRA campaigns. The Red Mole always stressed the importance of developing the institutions of popular control in these areas, for this reason. But it is necessary to say with hindsight that it is unlikely that they could have spread puddle-like until the whole of Ireland was one large no-go area. Their existence was important, but the potential which their existence represented was even more important. That potential still exists; the Free Areas did not generate the minority's resistance. they were a symptom of it. As the struggle unfolds it may well be that new liberated zones will be created, and the minority has learned that it can successfully defy the might of British imperialism, and drive it back even if only temporarily from its 800 year long occupation of their country. They will be slow to forget that.
KEY PROBLEMS The overall situation in the North of Treland is dominated by the inability of British imperialism to impose a solution, and the fact that the forces involved in the liberation struggle are unable to extend the lines of battle beyond their present limits. This could result in an extended period during which the contending forces are unable to inflict a decisive defeat on their opponents. Increasingly the questions facing the revolutionary movement in Ireland are:- "How can new forces be brought into the struggle on the side of the catholic minority?"; and "Can this be done before British imperialism imposes a solution based on the exhaustion of the forces of resistance?"
The future path for the Irish struggle is clear-it must be turned into a 32 County struggle, involving the mass of the workers and small farmers. They cannot consolidate any victories unless they go over to a fight for a Workers Republic. The key problem is that while the leadership necessary to carry the struggle forward from its Civil Rights phase to the phase of national struggle emerged, there is no indication of the potential leadership emerging which can tackle the problem of the next-the socialistphase of the struggle. And just as the actual demands of the Civil Rights phase could not be met before the national struggle came onto the agenda, national liberation, while being the central aspect of the struggle at present, will not be won before the socialist revolution becomes a very immediate question facing the masses.
Thus the political and geographical limitations of the present struggle are intimately linked, and the immediate problems facing the revolution in Ireland can only be viewed in terms of tackling the immense problems involved in breaking out of these limits. Any criticism of the main forces involved in the struggle, particularly of the Provisionals, can only have meaning if it is directed towards solving these problems.
THE BELFAST BOMBINGS That is why it is necessary to be very clear about the events of "Bloody Friday". It is useless to make abstract condemnations of "terrorism" and to declare in solemn tones that terrorism cannot achieve anything. The fact is that the Provisionals bombing campaign was as important as their offensive against the British Army, and the resistance of the masses in bringing down Stormont.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the bombings in Belfast were used by the British for their own ends, and to their own advantage. The advantages which they did gain are very limited, but for the purpose of the invasion important. This illustrates that while the present lines of battle remain unchanged even the most developed military technique can rebound politically on the IRA. Without a solution of the problems of how to escalate the struggle in the North into an all-Ireland struggle which combines the completion of the national with the working class revolution the Provos will be balked in similar ways in the future.
But in the long run Britain cannot win. Whitelaw's initiative was the nearest they have got yet to imposing a solution, and having run that policy down with their own tanks the Heath government can face only a mounting crisis as the resentment of the minority is translated into a new round of the struggle against the Army of occupation.
Bob Purdie DERRY