Despite the fact that Nixon has so far refused to sign the settlement, there can be little doubt that the recent negotiations have been taken very seriously by the North Vietnamese and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). While it would be naive to ignore the fact that the revolutionary forces have been compelled to make some concessions, it would be equally facile to assume that the revolution has been defeated.
The proposed settlement comes almost five years after the NF's Tet offensive of 1968 made it impossible for the United States to continue the ground war in Southern Vietnam with its own troops. The repercussions of the offensive within the United States also compelled LBJ to order a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam, and made it impossible for him to be re-nominated as the candidate of the Democratic Party.
Under Nixon, the more expendable Saigon troops had to be substituted increasingly for G.l.'s. But this meant a shift towards a massive concentration on the use of air power. The heavy bombing was aimed at destroying the physical and social environment within which the Liberation forces operated. The murderous intensity with which this electronic and aerial war has been pursued, only illustrates the desperation of the United States, Imperialism had decided that even though it was being forced to withdraw from Indochina without scoring a military victory it would nevertheless make the Vietnamese people suffer for their gains. In other words it was increasing the cost of social revolution in order to modify the impact a withdrawal would have on other puppet regimes in the colonial world. -VIETNAMISATION"
The crucial importance of the offensive launched by the NEF several months ago lies in the fact that it cut through the whole policy of "Vietnamisation." The only way the United States could stave off total disaster was to escalate the war to new heights. It blockaded the ports of North Vietnam and increased the bombing of both the North and South to an extent unparalleled in the annals of war. It has been this escalation which has prevented a collapse of the Thieu regime, and not the fighting qualities of the puppet armies. It is vital to grasp this fact if we are to understand the meaning of the settlement which the Vietnamese are prepared to sign. A recent issue of the Scientific American revealed:
"In the seven years between 1965 and 1971 the U.S. military forces exploded 26 billion [milliard] pounds .. . of munitions in Indochina, half from the air and half from weapons on the ground. This staggering weight of ordnance amounts to the energy of 450 Hiroshima nuclear bombs. For the area and population of Indochina as a whole it represents an average of 142 pounds of explosive per acre of land and 584 pounds per person.
It means that over the seven-year period the average rate of detonation was 118 pounds per second. These average figures, however, give no indication of the actual concentration;
most of the bombing was concentrated in time (within the years from 1967 on) and in area. Of the 26 billion pounds, 21 billion were exploded in South Vietnam and 2.6 billion in southern Laos. The bombardment in South Vietnam represented an overall average of 497 pounds per acre and 1,215 pounds per person; the maior part, however was focussed on two regions: the five American G.I.s in Vietnam, 1968: repercussions of Tet offensive in U.S. led to replacement by Saigon troops. Saigon."
And this estimate does not take into account the bombing in 1972 which has exceeded all previous levels.
THREE FRONTS From the beginning of their offensive the NLF have made it clear that they were fighting on three fronts: (1) Militarily, to destroy the effectiveness of the armed forces on which the Thieu regime depends internally. (2) Diplomatically, to bring pressure to bear on the Americans to withdraw their support for Thieu on which he banks externally. (3) Politically, to build up to the point of seizing power the coalition of forces envisaged in the 7-point Peace Plan of the PRG. They expected victory to be a process involving advances on all three fronts. There can be little doubt that from the beginning of the offensive they were able to throw the disposition and logistics of the Saigon troops into complete contusion. The Thieu regime was forced to respond to the challenge which confronted it and thus repeatedly exposed its limited corps of dependable troops. This meant that the Saigon troops had to be withdrawn from "pacification work", i.e. from acting as permanent jailers of the civilian population. This enabled the LF to reestablish its control over wide areas on the Coastal Lowlands, in the Mekong Delta and on the outskirts of Saigon itself. The offensive thus enabled the NLF to extend its control, but the scale of the bombing prevented it from scoring any spectacular victories.
Nevertheless the credibility of the Thieu regime was weakened even further both inside the United States and in Vietnam. But, as we argued in The Red Mole at the time, the offensive was directed not only against the Thieu regime, but also meant as a warning to Moscow and Peking. Here it failed miserably. The blame for this does not in any way lie with the Vietnamese militants. The finger has to be pointed at the real capitulators who put their own narrow bureaucratic interests before those of the Indochinese revolution. It is the ossified bureaucrats in Moscow and Peking who are responsible for the diplomatic reverses suffered by the Vietnamese.
MOSCOW AND PEKING What has been the role of Moscow and Peking? In brief they have: 1. Made it possible for Nixon to stay in office by coming to terms with him at a time when the collapse of "Vietnamisation" had seriously damaged his standing within the ruling class, already divided on the war. The Peking visit, in particular, was a big gain for Nixon's election campaign and a tremendous blow to the Vietnamese struggle. At a time when the bombing of Northern Vietnam had been resumed at a greater intensity than even before, Mao Tse Tung and Chou en Lai proposed toasts to the representative of a government responsible for this crime.
There are not many examples of cynicism of this sort even on the part of bureaucrats.
The visit to Moscow a few weeks later was a grotesque re-run. Here Brezhnev and Kosygin, determined not to be outdone by Mao, clinked champagne glasses as they proposed toasts together with Nixon to world peace.
The agreements reached in Peking and Moscow were sealed with the blood of the Vietnamese workers and peasants. Far from putting pressure on Nixon to withdraw immediately there is growing evidence which suggests that it is the Vietnamese who have been pressured by Moscow and Peking to accommodate Nixon.
The most obvious Chinese statement in support of the deal with Nixon at the expense of the Indochinese revolution came last July, when Chou en Lai praised the Korean armistice as a model of international relations.
For the Soviet bureaucracy the well-known KGB "journalist", Victor Louis, wrote in June that the North Vietnamese had tried to "undermine" the Nixon-Brezhnev summit with an offensive in North Vietnam.
2. In making sure that Nixon won the Primaries in Moscow and Peking the Russians and the Chinese virtually reassured his reLAOS THAILAND Pnompenh Gulf of Siam Washington. Areas both shaded and white represent disputed land.
election. This is somewhat odd since McGovern was pledged to end the war, was the most "left' candidate from within the bourgeoisie, clearly had the approval of the Vietnamese and was being supported by the American Communist Party. While for revolutionists the question of supporting bourgeois candidates is not even raised, there is no reason to disbelieve McGovern's insistence that he would have ended the war as this is undoubtedly the view of an important though not decisive section of the American ruling class.
While the Vietnamese were clearly outraged by the attitude of Moscow and Peking they were far too reticent in making their views public. Certainly a number of Nhan Dhan editorials made it clear that they were displeased with Peking and Moscow, but this was not sufficient. If the Vietnamese had privately threatened the Chinese with a public denunciation if the Nixon visit took place, both Moscow and Peking would have had second thoughts. The prestige of the Vietnamese revolution within the world workers movement is such that a threat from the Vietnamese could have been devastatingly effective.
BALANCE OF FORCES The actual terms of the agreement can only be properly understood if we understand the real balance of forces within South Vietnam. While the detailed and precise information is probably available only to the Vietnamese, nevertheless the map which we publish clearly reveals the enormous possibilities which remain Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are shown in white. Shading in these countries indicates communist-controlled territor with cross-hatching marking Communist base areas.)
Hanoi NORTH VIETNAM Gulf of Tonkin Donghoi 304, 308, 312, 325 C Di •DEMILITARTLED LOR!
Tchepa + Quangtr S. Viet Marine t S.V. 1 DM Hue. /S.V. 3 Div. ramna Danan MY 711 0N N.V. 2 Div. KV 3200/38Vi2 SS.V. 23 Div. T SOUTH VIETNAM ements off.v.70 IN.V. 33 DI S.V. 25 Div S.V. 9 Div.
Cantho S.V. 21 Div.
South China Sea New York Times map shows military situation in Indochina based on information from open for the revolutionary forces. This is what explains the failure of Nixon to sign. An immediate ceasefire would have left only the major cities in Thieu's control and the impending withdrawal of the American presence and its purchasing power would have begun to disintegrate the puppet administration. The release of the NLF prisoners would have further weakened the morale of the Thieu regime and its narrow base of support.
It should be remembered that the South Vietnamese economy is no longer what it was at the beginning of the war. Agriculture, trade and industry have been hopelessly disrupted and wealth is now based on U.S. aid, speculation, smuggling, crime, prostitution and the black market. Thieu's power therefore does not rest on a distinct social class, but on the army. A ceasefire and a release of prisoners coupled with the withdrawal of all US troops would lead to an enormous demoralisation within the ranks of this army. Thus the withdrawal of all American personnel and a stop of the bombing would in itself represent a significant gain for the armed forces of the liberation. Another important fact is that the terms of the settlement as revealed by Hanoi indicate that the United States has not made any demand for the withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops. This means, in effect, recognising that there is one Vietnam.
CONCESSIONS The areas where the PRG and the North Vietnamese have made concessions are to participate in a coalition government with Thieu,
«The national officials acted as strike-breakers" - Thornycroft worker