IMGpapers

Newspapers of the International Marxist Group and its forerunners, 1968–1988

THE POLITICS OF THE PROVISIONALS

The Red Mole Vol. 3, No. 56, 27 November 1972 · pp. 4-5 of the scan · 2,078 words

The scan: v03n56-nov-27-1972.pdf (PDF, Marxists Internet Archive, opens at this page)

Uncorrected machine reading. This text was read by machine (Apple Vision OCR) from a scan of a newspaper page, and the page was cut into articles by machine, at the headlines found by their type size. Nothing has been corrected: expect misread words, text from a neighbouring article, and titles that are the machine reading of the headline, some of them only fragments. Quote from the scan, not from this page.
How this article was cut and titled: headline found by type size in the OCR geometry (split_tabloid.py); 1-3 of 4; machine-segmented newspaper page; uncorrected Vision OCR.

page 4 of the scan

In this article, which continues our series of analyses of Irish political organisations, Bob Purdie and Gery Lawless examine the Provisional Republican Movement. Since this article attempts to make a more rounded and developed analysis of the Provisionals than any we have yet published*, we would welcome a discussion on the issues raised. PROGRAMME The fundamental political definition of a movement, derives from its programme. Lenin defined the British Labour Party as bourgeois, despite its proletarian composition, because its programme, far from posing a transformation to socialism, was merely an alternative method of operating the capitalist system. In this programmatic sense the Provisionals, despite their ad hererence to the objective of a "democratic socialist republic", are bourgeois nationalists. Such a definition is not an epithet. but merely the starting point of a serious analysis. It absolutely does not mean that the Provisionals are reactionary, on the contrary Irish nationalism poses certain necessary and progressive advances which, while they correspond to the classical tasks of a bourgeois democratic revolution, are in the interests of the masses of the Irish workers and small farmers. The latter must fight for these objectives whether or not the Irish bourgeoisie does and against the bourgeoisie if it resists that struggle. Therefore the relationship between the Provisionals and Irish capitalism does not stem abstractly from their programme, but from the relationship of the Irish bourgeoisie to these political The Irish bourgeoisie long ago surrendered the banner of nationalism, and is determ ined to retain its servile relationship with British imperialism. In so far as the Provisionals struggle for a bourgeois national programme they will be obliged not only to come into conflict with the bourgeoisie, but can only base themselves on the workers and small farmers. The important question is whether they can transcend that programme through conflict with the Irish bourgeoisie. and the pressure of the class interests of their social base. It is this contradiction between the programme of the Provisionals and the process of Permanent Revolution in Ireland which gives them the impulse for a move to the left. But it is only the intervention of Marxists, explaining the necessity of a socialist strategy, in terms of the immediate problems which face the masses engaged in the national struggle, which can create a clear understanding of why the combined national and socialist revolutions in Ireland, can only be fought for with a different programme.

"EIRE NUA"

To examine these programmatic questions more thoroughly, it is necessary to deal with some aspects of "Eire Nua", the social and economic programme of the Provisional Sinn Fein. "Eire Nua" combines three distinct political elements.

The first of these is straight reforms within the existing capitalist framework;

the second, vague and eclectic elements of traditional Irish liberal thought, given a radical twist by posing them as the outgrowth of popular struggles rather than as concessions from above. There is, however, little evidence that such policies as the establishment of co-operatives, credit unions etc. have ever been a major force within the Irish masses, and certainly have never mobilised any *See Ireland Unfree by Bob Purdie, for a discussion of the history of Republicanism, including the split which produced the Officials and Provisionals. (IMG Publications 30p) struggles which have challenged the State. The third element is more important. since it does have roots in real struggle. This element is the radical concept of the relationship between the state and property as advanced by Padraig Pearse in The Sovereign People, the Proclamation of the Republic in 1916, and the Democratic Programme of the First Dail: the idea that property ought to belong to the people of the nation as a whole, and be distributed, according to their will, by a democratic state. In this traditional Republicanism came near to socialism. But such a demand is not in itself socialist. Socialism is a qualitatively new system of society. distinguished from capitalism by the political, social, economic and cultural tasks it accomplishes, and not merely by the way in which it is administered It is entirely possible for this kind of demand to be achieved within capitalism. Indeed it was first put forward by that most radical of bourgeois democrats, Tom Paine, who influencedithe French and American bourgeois revolutions. However it is impossible for such a demand to be achieved within latter-day Irish capitalism. So this clement in the programme has great potential: but only because a fight for it would demonstrate the inadequacy of the programme as a whole, and the need for a socialist programme based on a Marxist analysis of the needs of the Irish workers and small farmers.

REGIONAL GOVERNMENT Based on this programme the Provisionals have two main strategic objectives: to smash partition by destroying the Northern state, and forcing British imperialism to take its troops out of Ireland, and to transfer state power from the two partitionist assemblies to new regional parliaments based on community organisation of the people. This latter objective is rarely discussed but is however an extremely important aspect of the Provisionals strategy since it is designed to solve such important problems as the relationship of the masses in the South to the struggle in the North and to break down resistance to Irish unity by the protestants. (ft is argued that a regional parliament for the nine Counties of Ulster would have a protestant majority, and that such a radical degree of autonomy would.

operating in favour of the protestants, win acceptance from them.)

In analysing this strategy (of regional parliaments) Marxists cannot simply state that it is utopian and non-socialist but must try to see the direction in which it takes the Provisionals. he proposal for Dail Uladh has a kernel of revolutionary potential. Although it was orginally posed as an institution created from the top, it was later drastically modified and was designed to base itself on the street committees and other organisations created in the North by the struggle against British imperialism. However despite the tact that its stated aims make a how in the direction of the civil resistance movement.

in practice Comhairle Uladh (the body set up to prepare for the creation of Dail Uladh) has settled down to a-political, a-historical, and a-class propaganda for regional government. The same is true of Comhairle Connacht, set up in the west of Ireland: the recently formed Comhairle Munhan, and Comhairle Laghain give no evidence of being different.

Concentrating their resources on abstract propaganda, these bodies have led the Provisionals into an alliance with right wing elements who, while they pose no tremendous danger, since they are politically impotent, help to separate out the two strands of the Provos' strategy and keep the second element abstract and a political. An examination of the material produced by these bodies reveals a startling political naivety. Take the Faroes for Example, a pamphlet by Desmond Fennell (a right-wing Irish writer) argues that the Faroe Islands are prosperous because they have a healthy social structure, and a deep sense of regional loyalty. Fennell mentions, but gives no weight to the fact that the Faroes are a solitary example of a successful one-crop economy. The smoked fish industry provides a greater surplus than is normal for a primary producing country, and this combined with the relatively progressive policies of Denmark is the basis for the social structure and the re-birth of Faroese national culutre. The example of the Faroes is relevant only as an exception, and if for instance, the west of Ireland is to emulate them, it is precisely by forcing imperialism to concede a different relationship. Fennell does not pose such a struggle, which is conceivable only with a socialist programme THE ECONOMIC BOMBING The Provisional bombing campaign has been almost uniformly misunderstood or misrepresented. So-called "Marxists" have sternly denounced "terrorism" which they have defined in a quite un-Marxist way as a question of military technique, rather than as a question of the political relationship between military action and the musses.

The bombing campaign had two main purposes. Firstly, it was designed to seriously disrupt commercial life in the main cities. In turn this had two subsidiary purposes: to bring pressure to bear on the British government: and simultaneously to break up the foundations of the Six County state. It was secondly an important defensive measure: the British Army had to dispose of large forces in the centre of the cities, forces which could have been used in the period before Operation Motorman to saturate the Catholic ghettoes. The methods now being used in these areas are an indication of what this would have meant. Whole populations are constantly under surveillance by the Army, constantly threatened with arrest, and/or harassment. This seriously undermines their ability to engage in political resistance. Fortunately the Army has not yet been able to totally crush the people but if they were able to dispose of large enough forces they would. By obliging the Army to protect the city centres the Provisional IRA contributes directly to the possibility of mass political opposition. Thus the bombing campaign is not terrorist. If we draw up a balance sheet, it shows a very heavy balance on the positive side. The campaign helped to maintain the free areas for much longer than they would otherwise have existed, by pinning Supporters of the Provisionals disrupt meeting of pho down large numbers of troops. It forced the British Government into scrapping successive policies for victory in the North, and most important it smashed Stormont, which was the cement which held the Unionist monolith together. The Red Mole has constantly stressed that the fragmentation of Orangeism is a historic step forward in the struggle. It must be said, to the Provos credit, that they understood very clearly that this would happen.

SECTARIANISM AND THE BOMBINGS But there is of course a negative side. The campaign has been accompanied by a high civilian casualty rate; there have been actions which have seemed sectarian (in the sense of being directed against the protestant population rather than the State, or forces of occupation). In particular Official Republicans would point to the elimination of such points of contact between protestant and catholic workers as the West Belfast Housing Alliance. And it has from time to time caused serious rifts within the catholic population itself.

Even accepting all of these at face value, they do not outweigh the tremendous positive results of the campaign. But when these points are examined more closely, some of them must be heavily qualified. It would be legitimate to say that the Provisionals should have learned from the experience of the Donegal Street bombing, that the Army and the RUC were liable to manoeuvre large numbers of civilian casualties, during a blitz on the scale of the so-called "Bloody Friday" bombings. On the other hand, one shoult not ignore the purely military factors which can frustrate the designs of such an operation. As we saw with the Aldershot bombing, bombs can go off prematurely: the use of inexperienced volunteers (due to internment) has caused more problems. Also it is not always possible to choose only the best targets. and often pure chance intervenes. So far as the sectarian connotations are concerned, it must be clearly stated that the aim of the campaign was not sectarian. Because of the structure of employment in the Six Counties, an economic bombing campaign inevitably hits harder against protestant than catholic workers. It is a pity that the West Belfast Housing Alliance was broken up, but one must seriously question whether suen organisations can create working class unity without the destruction of the main barriers between the workers, the institutions of the sect-. arian state. Those who argue that no action which increases sectarianism should be taken, will find themselves with a problem. Since any action which threatens the status quo of a sectarian state will polarise those who are for and against that state, it will result in an increase of sectarianism. The Civil Rights Movement is a classic example, its aims and activities were manifestly non-sectarian, but it led directly to the communal violence of August 1969. Does anyone seriously say that the Civil Rights campaign should not have been started? There have been directly sectarian actions carried out by catholics against protestants. These must be deplored, and every effort made to eliminate them. But they are not directly the responsibility of the

page 5 of the scan

Why Europe welcomes

----- pull-quotes -----

Ti НЕПИ

← LOUGHBOROUGH STRIKE CONTINUESENGLAND STILL THE KNEE →

Something wrong on this page?