In the carly days of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (VS), a debate developed between the revolutionary left and the Communist Party. We argued that the best way of building the movement was by making it clear that we were for the victory of the National Liberation Front and for the defeat of U.S. imperialism. The Communist Party argued that this was an "ultra-left" position and would put off many "people in the middle". In the years 1967-68 the VSC demonstrated in practice how it was possible to mobilise tens of thousands of people in militant street demonstratsons on correct and principled slogans. Moreover the VSC finally succeeded in forcing the "people in the middle" to take sides in this war. Even the CP was finally obliged under the pressure to participate in the last two demonstrations organised by the VSC on the political basis of Victory to the Vietnamese Revolution, Victory to the NLF.
REASONS FOR THE DECLINE The decline in the solidarity movement was related to the rise of working class struggles, false hopes that the war was about to end, and an adaptation by most of the revolutionary groups to the "immediate situation" confronting them in Britain. We have to be very clear on this last point. It does not imply that we would have continued to mobilise tens of thousands of militants if we had continued to agitate on the question of the war. What it does mean is that we would have thoroughly educated the vanguard so that in cases of sharp changes in the international situation we could have had a solid basis on which a solidarity movement could have been rapidly re-constructed.
The creation of the Indochina Solidarity Conference in December and the fact that the International Socialism group is marching on this demonstration are positive steps in rebuilding the solidarity movement. The I.S. should institutionalise this shift by joining The month of February will be the fifth month the Indochina Solidarity Conference and strengthening it through consistent activity and work on this question.
DIFFERENCES One important factor in rebuilding the solidarity movement is to understand that the old differences between the CP and ourselves have not evaporated. They have merely taken new forms. That is why the British Campaign for Peace in Vietnam (BCPV), essentially the C.P.'s front for intervention in this field of work and staffed by old faithfuls and fellow-travellers (who for some strange reason continue to pretend that they have nothing to do with the C.P.) has refused to have a common rally with the Indochina Solidarity Conference. Despite the latter's efforts to have a single united rally and demonstration, the BCPV refused to share their platform with the ISC. That is why the ISC was forced to hold a separate rally at Charing Cross Embankment; but despite this it decided to march to Trafalgar Square for a united and joint demonstration.
The CP's respectable, parliamentarist orientation forces it to gravitate towards left' MP's such as John Mendelson, and pacifist demagogues such as Lord Soper, who has consistently attacked "both sides" in the war. It is this general orientation which determines the C.P.'s tactics on the issue of Vietnam and which is not dissimilar to that of sections of the Labour Party.
THE "SIGN NOW" DEBATE However there is another disagreement within the solidarity movement as a whole, and this is related to what attitude we should adopt towards the position of "Sign Now". This question can best be understood in two parts: (1) Those like the C.P., and its adjunct, the BCPV, who say that "Sign Now" should be the principle orientation for the solidarity movement. This in our view totally disarms the solidarity movement because it implies that the key factor in the war is the signing of a piece of paper, and that after this is done incorrect. It also fits in beautifully with the C.P.'s generalised approach of "pressurepolitics". Thus the CP argues that if we pressurise Nixon (via Heath) to "Sign Now" and he does so it can be presented as a big