TERRIBLE * Living conditions lower tuan in the * Unemployment at over 20 per cent; * 30,000 killed; * Thousands detained in concentration camps, * Over 2,000 simply 'missing'; * The price of bread up by 140 times; * Total sales of food down by over 25 per cent.
These are a few of the statistics that give an idea of the terrible price that the Chilean workers and peasants have had to pay for two long years since the bloody military coup of 11 September 1973. To them can be added tne use of the most modern torture techniques •including the widespread torture and sexual abuse of women, the armies of beggars that cram the centres of the cities, the children who die of malnutrition, and not least, the awesome atmosphere of fear that pervades the whole country. The list of the sufferings that have been imposed is seemingly never ending, and reveals in a graphic way the horrors of life in the Chile of the generals.
The junta has exacted a mighty price from those who dared to threaten the capitalist way of life in Chile. But in doing so it has begun to encounter increasingly serious problems. When it came to power it set about applying an economic policy that was designed entirely to benefit imperialism and those sections of the Chilean bourgeoisie most closely tied to imperialism. It hoped to be able to stabilise the economy, create conditions for the superexploitation of the workforce, and on that basis to draw in foreign capital which could then be used to finance an export-orientated consumer durable goods industry.
Chile was to be a repeat of the Brazilian "miracle' - but times have changed since the Brazilian gorillas came to power in 1964, and the junta's strategy was doomed from the start.
In the first place, they have not even succeeded in stabilising the economy. Inflation, for example, ran at over 527 per cent for the 12 months preceding April 1975. Secondly the world recession militates strongly against big investments in the consumer durables sector by imperialist capital - particularly in countries with raging inflation. Added to this have been other factors, such as the fall in the price of copper (the linchpin of the Chilean economy, the necessity for Chile to import 75 per cent of its oil, and the growing economic and political isolation of the regime which culminated in the refusal of most of the capitalist nations in the 'Club of Paris' to renegotiate the junta's debts.
As a result, the necessary foreign capital has not come in and the junta is left with the immediate social consequences of its policies - unemployment and mass poverty.
- The failure of its economic measures has stimulated those sections of the Chilean capitalists who had least to gain from the junta's policies to come out into open opposition to the military. Recently the whole of the bourgeois Christian Democrat party, which represents those Chilean capitalists whose profits depend on the internal market - a market which has been decimated as a consequence of the economic policies - announced that it was against the junta. A year ago only small sections of this party, which played a major role in preparing the coup, were willing to oppose the regime.
NO ALTERNATIVE But no matter how strong the opposition and how complete the failure of its economic strategy, the junta still has one trump card to play. It can claim to be the only force which can control the working class, albeit by the most brutal and sustained repression. The Chilean big bourgeoisie will not consider any alternative to the junta unless it can guarantee its ability to contain the workers and peasants.
The Christian Democrats have therefore decided to approach the matter from a different tionary politics could stand clearly opposed angle. They have launched a campaign to win the support of the Chilean workers and peasants in which they seek to pose as the defenders of liberty' and "social justice. This has been taken up in alliance with the hierarchy ised structures inside Chile. The MIR has been the main target of the junta's repression, especially over the last year, and has lost many courageous militants. Nonetheless, it has managed to survive and is now re-organising and regrouping.
The CP. on the other hand, has set itself the task of being the best allies of the Christian Democracy. They have drawn the conclusion from the coup that the main error of the Popular Unity period was that they did not form a unity with this bourgeois party earlier or at least with important sections of it. Evidently they have been engaged in negotiations with Frei to see if terms for a joint agreement can be reached. They have even been working hand-in-hand with the Christian Democrat forces in their efforts to re-organise the workers' movement.
NO MISTAKES!
Outside the country, the parties of the Popular Unity all exist in exile. They met totogether jointly for the first time since the coup this August, and decided to reconstitute the Popular Unity. A statement issued after the meeting announced that errors of leadership were partly to blame for the defeat', but 'that in no way detracts from the general correctness of the process begun by the Popular In other words, after two years of suffering, after the greatest defeat ever inflicted on the Chilean workers, the leaders of the reformist and Stalinist organisations can only proclaim that they were right all along - and indeed, given half a chance, will apply again the strategy of the gradual and peaceful road to socialism.
In the meantime they urge that all democrats in Chile should unite against the junta and that the army should now seize the opportunity to vindicate (sic) themselves and take action against the generals. In this way the parties of the Popular Unity fall in behind and add their weight to the attempts of the Christian Democracy to win the support of the working class.
Revolutionaries must oppose these machinations. They must ensure that from the blood