Declaration by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International The pre-revolutionary situation that opened in Portugal with the beginning of 1975 has gone through an exacerbation marked by the governmental crisis, the growing division of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA), and the fascist attacks in the North of the country, but above all by the massive emergence of the autonomous movement of the masses, as revealed by the 20 August demonstration, the impact of which has begun to make itself felt on the reformist organisations, The division of the MFA, triggered by the rise of the class struggle, makes it impossible to stabilise the army, which has been profoundly undermined by the crisis of the hierarchical system and by the political debates and divisions (especially around the COPCON document and the 'document of the nine'). In the short run, this breakdown of the army, which is occurring in a context of generalised social crisis, makes it impossible to launch a reactionary coup d'etat without running the risk of civil war. In the face of the MFA's incapacity to stabilise its Bonapartist function, the bourgeoisie has moved to counter-attack on several fronts:
internationally, through blackmail threats of economic strangulation on the part of the European imperialist powers (whether with or without social democratic governments) and through the financial and military pressure exerted by American imperialism on Portugal and the Portuguese dependencies (the Azores, Madeira, Timor and Angola).
nationally, through the de facto junction of the terrorist attacks, the anti-conmunist mobilisations exploiting the discontent of the petty bourgeoisie of the North, and the civilian and military political offensive combining the orientation of the SP leadership with the great manoeuvres of Melo Antunes and sections of the military hierarchy.
The 20 August demonstration, which drew 50,000 people, more than a thousand of whom were soldiers, revealed the maturation of the combativity and the elevation of the level of consciousness of important sec tions of the working class, especially in the workers' bastions of Lisbon and the southern region. The radical character of the demands advanced by these sectors - for the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, workers' control, and the reconversion of production - objectively place on the agenda the necessity of a centralisation of the autonomous organs of the worers (workers commissions, popular assemblies, neighbourhood commissions) in order to respond to the need for socialist planning of the Nevertheless, the present geographical limitation and uneven development and functioning of these organs must be stressed.
The situation is thus characterised by an increased polarisation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, although this does not imply that there will be an immediate qualitative modification of the relationship of forces between the two fundamental classes.
With the accentuation of the economic crisis, which will provoke an intensification of workers' struggles that will run up against the Government's inability to meet the workers' demands, the possibility of the current pre-revolutionary situation being transformed into a real revolutionary crisis emerges.
For this, it is important that all initiatives be taken so that the autonomous organs of the workers are developed, coordinated, and centralised, thus permitting a real response to the demands of the toiling masses and to the division of the working class that has been accentuated by the leaderships of the SP and CP. Toward this end, it is necessary that the autonomous organs take charge of the defence and generalisation of workers' control, the expropriation of the capitalists, the arming of the proletariat, and the enactment of measures to establish a monopoly of foreign trade, to deepen the agrarian reform, and to institute planning.
In face of the attempts of the 'group of nine' to re-establish discipline in the army, to put an end to the beginning of the emergence of workers' militias, and to stabilise the MFA as an instrument of the hierarchy, it becomes all the more imperative to forge links between the revolutionary soldiers and officers and the workers' commissions, neighbourhood commissions, etc., and to generalise the election of officers by assemblies of soldiers.
Likewise, it is necessary to advance adequate measures (selective price support, moratoria on debts, credit, direct liaison between consumers and small-scale producers, etc.) in order to neutralise reaction's utilisation of layers of the petty bourgeoisie, the minifundistas of the North among others.
Finally, the centralisation of the autonomous organs of the workers in order to carry out these tasks will take the form of the convocation of a National People's Assembly composed of delegates of the workers' commissions, the neighbourhood commissions, the assemblies of military units, and the popular assemblies.
The essential obstacle to the realisation of this strategic objective lies in the pol icy of division followed by the leaderships of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party.
The policy of the social democratic leadership, which manifestly aims at halting the revolutionary process, is beginning to meet the first signs of resistance from the SP's rank and file workers, in spite of the sectarianism and bureaucratic methods utilised against the SP by the CP leadership.
Concurrently, the zigzags of the Stalinist leadership of the CP have provoked disorientation among the CP rank and file at a time when a workers' vanguard is forcefully emerging onto the political scene.
Thus, it is not only necessary but also pos sible to carry out an audacious policy of workers united front directed at both the SP and CP in order to consolidate a response by the working class as a whole to capitalist reaction, to defend the gains of the workers, and to spur on the development of the revolutionary process. The autonomous organs of the toiling masses are the bodies that are best suited to realise this united front, for in their present form they already group together Socialist workers, Communist workers, revolutionary workers, and workers who belong to no political party.
testifies to the shift of the relationship of forces between the workers' vanguard and the reformist apparatuses.
In the present conjuncture, it was politically correct to seek a united front accord with the CP. But the accord of 25 August did not respond to the actual requirements of the situation.
(a) The accord in effect sanctioned the CP's policy of supporting the Government and maintaining the unity of the MFA, precisely at the moment that the MFA was being ripped apart by the pressure of antagonistic class forces (b) The accord mentioned no concrete objective that would permit the unification of the working class and the actual stimulaalso fell within the framework of the perspective of integrating the autonomous organs in opposition to their real independence of the institutions of the bourgeois state.
(e) Thus, the accord could easily serve the objective of the CP (as it did during the 27 August demonstration), which is to utilise the weight of the workers' vanguard to negotiate compromises on the level of the state apparatus, the government, the army, and the MFA under the best possible conditions.
Now, the relationship of forces permitted revolutionaries to seize this opportunity to lead the CP to take a position on the implementation of the essential tasks necessary for the progress of the revolution. Here, again, the lack of concrete objectives and the concessions made to the CP's political orientation prevented the lessons of the policy of the CP leadership and the rupture of the 'front' from being clearly drawn before the masses In the workers' and people's coun ter-offensive based on the real dynamic of the mass movement, the Trotskyist militants of the LCI will stand in the front ranks of all initiatives fostering the extension, generalisation and centralisation of the autonomous organs of the workers and the self-defence of the workers.
It is through the capacity of revolutionary Marxists to fulfill these tasks that the revolutionary party, indispensable for the victory of the Portuguese socialist revolution, will be able to develop The Fourth International and all its sec tions and sympathising organisations will support the comrades of the LCI by all means at their disposal and will press for all mobilisations of solidarity with the revolu tionary struggle of the Portuguese workers. 2 September, 1975