The 'siege mentality being sown by the Government in Spaia today is just a political stunt. Over fifteen years ago Spain had to abandon its efforts to build up an independent economy and today is heavily dependent on its relations with the Common Market - something the Spanish capitalists know full well. This makes international solidarity - aimed to isolate the Spanish dictatorship politically and economically and aid those fighting for its overthrow - now more important than ever. the month of June:
repressive apparatus the army. composed of prestigious officers. that are beginning to undermine it. their lawyers. Euzkadi [the Basque country ], the general strike against the state of exception that was imposed there. The regime, whose fundamental basis is repression, applied the most brutal repressive measures it could muster, and after two months they saw the result: 100,000 strikers against the state of exception during This strike marked the failure of the state of exception. So the dictatorship looked for other measures. More and more, the regime's policy boils down to the utilisation of the Nonetheless, the internal contradictions are multiplying, and today they even affect For instance, opposition to the Francoist dictatorship has been publicly expressed among the officer corps. This opposition is called the Military Democratic Union. It is difficult to say how large this group is numerically (probably it's a few hundred officers), but it has a certain audience and is To these contradictions within the military hierarchy has been added the development o rank-and-file organisation among the soldiers, especially in Euzkadi. The emergence of the first soldiers conmittees is very important.
-If you consider that the military tribunals are expected to hand down about a dozen death penalties during the coming month, you'can see how important it is for the dictatorship to make the army come forward as the protector of its power and as the, guarantor of the action of the repressive forces The regime is worried about the contradictions In this context, the dictatorship is seeking to use the actions of the FRAP and the ETA-V as a pretext to launch a desperate offensive against the mass movement. Repressive meas ures are being used on a mass scale. The right of habeas corpus has been suspended and the legal limit for detention without trial has been extended from three to ten days. And ten days of torture is a very long time. Political prisoners can no longer communicate with supposed to be a progressive threatened during a meeting of workers that anyone who spoke in an assembly or mobilised would be denounced to the police as having violated the anti-terrorism laws.
v. What is the relationship between the gener al strikes in Euzkadi on 28 and 29 Augusi and the beginning of September and the preceding strikes of December 1974 and June 1975?
A. We have to point out that these three strike movements - December, June and August/September - developed in Euzkadi, but their influence was felt throughout the SpanLet's make a comparison of the three strike movements. On 1l December the thing that was decisive about the political general strike (which is a rarity in the European workers movement) was that it demonstrated that it was actually possible to hold a general strike.
Better yet, it was possible even against the will and actions of the reformists of the Spanish Communist Party, for the strike was convoked by the workers' commissions. li December demolished the CP argument that a general strike is an adventure, that conditions for a general strike do not yet exist, that you have to wait until the Junta Democratica I Democratic Council - a block of capitalist and workers parties established last year under the aegis of the CP] is built before engaging in such a movement.
-11 June represented mass defiance of the state of exception. It was the proof that it was possible to respond throughout the whole Spanish state, even against the toughest measures of the dictatorship.
The meaning of 28 August can be summed up in three points. First, it was a protracted political general strike, the first in the postwar history of the Spanish workers movement It didn't happen by accident. It was the result of long preparation. Ever since 12 June the vanguard had been working in the neighbour
hoods and factories to prepare this strike to save the lives of Garmendia and Otaegui.
The second characteristic is that it was initiated by a very broad political front of revolutionary and reformist organisations. The third characteristic is that it developed in a general situation in which the dictatorship was using all its repressive force without managing to break the movement; that is, the strike occurs on the threshold of the fall of the dictatorship.
Q. What are the main features that shaped the strike movement?
A. The highest level of struggle was reached in the provinces of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. The first characteristic was the very large number of strikers. There were about 150,000 on 28-29 August, about 60,000100,000 on 1-2 September and again on 11-12 September. The second characteristic, anu me most important one al boutom, Is the organisation of the movement and the confidence of the masses in the vanguard.
The third characteristic, just as important, was the development of forms of self-organisation. For instance, the general strike was called by a strike committee that took the form of a united front of workers' organisations. This time, it was not the workers' commissions that played such an important role, but the united front.
Wherever there were divisions (because of the existence of workers' commissions influenced by various organisations), there was a tendency to overcome this division on the zonal or factory scale through the construction of adequate co-ordinating bodies. At Naval, for example, the big factory in Bilbae (a city of 500,000) - where there are CP workers commissions as well as workers' commissions influenced by the far left and by the UGT, [ General Union of Workers, underground Socialist Party trade union], and where in addition there is a division between temporary and permanent workers — a united committee to develop the movement was formed in order to overcome these divisions. In Valle del Urola this unity was established in the form of inter-factory committees.
Finally, we should stress the politicisation and the extreme combativity. That was ex+ pressed in many different ways. I will show you howthis was shown in relation to selfdetence.
At the Babcock factory in Vizcaya (4,500 workers), the workers met in an assembly, and when they tried to leave they noticed that the plant was being watched by the special police. They then took the benches in the locker rooms, armed themselves with gasoline cans and various other instruments, and left the factory, shouting 'Charge!' The cops had to disperse and could arrest only a few workers who were at the rear of the contingent.
At Lequeitio in Vizcaya province 1,500 people in a town of 6,000 demonstrated in front of the barracks of the Guardia Civil, who hid inside and pointed their guns at the demonstrators, but remained behind the windows. That is an indication of the level of combativity of the masses.
In Algorta in Vizcaya there were five or six demonstrations of more than 1,000 people. The anti-repression committee includes 300 people on a permanent basis. undertaken and prisoners were released after having been seized by the BPS [the Political Social Brigade, one of the divisions of the political police]. Finally, and this is essential for the future, the Renteria strike committee set up a permanent self-defence committee that will demonstrations, assure their defence and so on.
Q. Could you explain the reasons for the uneven development and the problems that this can pose?
A. On the scale of the whole territory of the Spanish state, the uneven development must be understood on the one hand on the basis of the historical differences in the training of the working class, the differences in the tradition and so on, and on the other hand on the basis of the forty years of Francoist dictatorship.
The essential problem in breaking through this uneven development is to initiate mass solidarity with Euzkadi. Barcelona constitutes the key point if this solidarity is to have an impact in mobilising the heavy battalions of the working class.
The CP has an especially great responsibility for the limited development of mass solidarity. But, without being too self-congratulatory, we must say that with the exception of the LCR/ETA-VI nearly all the organisations of the so-called revolutionary left have failed to develop solidarity work to the level that is required by the political conjuncture.
The problem of uneven development is tragic on two levels. In Euzkadi the mass movement may quickly begin to feel isolated and could than start to hesitate. At another level, that of the political vanguard, a feeling of powerlessness could arise in face of the inability to develop solidarity.
Finally, this problem of uneven development has to be considered in relation to the difficult general situation. In a number of regions the very high rate of unemployment _red weekly 9 october 1975 LESSES policy of the Spanish CP? different. committee.
Actions were for what is going on in the country. strike committees.
is strengthening the impact of the repression by the employers. The workers are afraid of losing their jobs. The anti-terrorist law in creases the risks of solidarity action. And finally, the lack of information, which has not been counterbalanced by a systematic effort on the part of the revolutionary organisations, diminishes awareness of the level of struggle that has been attained in the Basque country and of the great defeat that this struggle already represents for the dictatorship.
Nevertre ess. we have to suress mias anere has been progress in solidarity over the past several months. For instance, in various cities there have been vanguard demonstrations of between 100 and 1,000 people. Propaganda and agitation is going on, despite the weakQ. Could you trace out what has been the A. First of all, I want to insist on the fact that the CP, because of its position and influence, could have played a key role in the development of solidarity. Second, there is a difference between the CP's general position and its practice during the latest mobilisations in Euzkadi. The CP is weaker in these provinces, it doesn't control the movement; and the relationship of forces with the far left is The CP signed the 11-12 September general strike appeal and it pushed for the mobilisation. On 28-29 August, on the other hand, it tried to slow the movement down by the army. systematically supporting the most rightwing positions in the Euzkadi general strike But the most important thing is that in strike -spite of its big statements on the radio else where, within the Spanish state the CP did nothing to develop solidarity. It did nothing to centralise the movement on the scale of the whole state; the only thing the CP tried to do was to grab hold of the tiger in the Basque country so as to be in a good position in case the movement really took off.
...only the best of company!
Above: Franco with Hitler in the 1930s: Below: He greets the Ambassador of the murderou Chilean regime. At the same Cabinet meeting at which he confirmed the death sentences on the five anti-fascist militants, Franco awarded Pinochet Spain's highest peacetime decoration.
Also, the CP took positions that can only be called scandalous; these positions were directed more to the bourgeois right than to the workers movement. For instance, the CP declared that terrorism cannot be combatted with the methods of the dictatorship, which means implicitly that there are better ways with statements like 'We are all responsible Beyond these considerations, perhaps the most important point is that neither the Junta Democratica nor the Convergencia Democratica [a similar body established under the aegis of the Social Democracy] played any role in Euzkadi. The level of the mass movement exposed the inadequacy of these types of instruments and the CP had to opt for the road of united front participation in the It was in Barcelona that the CP's responsibility was greatest. It did nothing. This cannot go on without raising problems within the CP. It is hard to see how the CP will be able to remain inactive for very long in the present situation. It is certainly going to try Spain to channel the movement toward objectives of struggle that are linked to the renewal of labour contracts and that involve the trade unions; but it would be false to analyse that in a one-sided way. This type of mobilisation can combine with the sort of struggle that is now developing and may lead to a major crisis.
Q. Could you quickly trace out the main pers pectives today?
A. You have to keep in mind three essential facts about the current political situation. First, the promulgation of the anti-terrorism law and the sentences handed down against Garmendia and Otaegui and against the militants of the FRAP indicate the extreme state of crisis of Francoism. Second, this crisis is now finding expression within the army and within sectors that have up to now been tied very closely to the regime.
Third, the very rapid fall of the stock market (which necessitated an accord between the banks and the Government), like the accusations of cowardice and lack of patriotism' the minister of industry has made against some capitalists, reflects the growing tension in the relations between the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship. Big capital is beginning to understand that the maintenance of the dictatorship is creating a situation that is rapidly becoming explosive and is generating an impressive increase of activity and consciousness among the the masses and a depreciation of the fundamental instruments of domination, especially Once again I must stress the decisive, fundamental role of the mass movement. The mass movement has taken the form of a protracted • with a complex and uneven development both in Euzkadi and in the Spanish state as a whole - and this shows that the overthrow of the dictatorship is on the agenda, if the movement that has developed in Euzkadi can combine with a movement throughout the territory of the Spanish state. If all this is placed within the framework of the current crisis of the regime, this combination that would place the overthrowof the regime on the agenda does not require that the level of struggle has to be uniform throughout the state before the regime is brought down.
Revolutionary Marxists must prepare to deal decisive blows against the dictatorship. We must centre our efforts on making the mass movement take a leap forward by stimulating all forms of self-organisation and by putting the emphasis on the tasks of self-defence, setting the highest objectives. Moreover, all efforts must be made to stimulate the solidarity movement throughout the state by making it go beyond the limits of the restricted mobilisation of a vanguard.
In face of this situation, the importance of international solidarity has to be stressed again and again. The mobilisations that have to be developed today to save Garmendia and Otaegui and the comrades of the FRAP who have been condemned to death will prepare the way for the even broader mobilisations that will have to be developed in solidarity with the Spanish revolution in the not so distant future.
WEEKLY