does not possess the soldiers to carry out a coup; from the economic point of view, the rising cost of living, unemployment, and the satisfaction of the most immediate needs are problems that cannot be resolved without a revolutionary regime; from the political point of view, illusions in bourgeois demucracy, illusions: in the reformists, are beginning to be clearly overcome and the workers finally underPrepared to resist at the RALIS barracks-but the vacillations of their officers turned the situation into a shambles Lisbon 'commune' into line.
For two days, an 25 and 26 November, slightly more than 400 commandos literally waltzed around from one area to another in the region of the capital. Colonel Jaime Neves emerged as a brilliant orchestra conductor capable of using a very small number of troops to whip several of the major military units of the As is logical, the working class took a waitand-see attitude towards this obscure military confrontation, with the exception of some sectors among whom a mobilisation took place at Setenave, for example, where the PRP has some influence).
Clearly the Communist Party did not join the operation, contrary to the possible expectations of the centrist groups or the forces nostalgic for the Fifth Division. The CP was content to mobilise defensively in the work places. On 27 November the CP published a communique stating: "The left forces committed to a grave error by over-estimating their own strength and attempting this desperate act.....The attempt of the forces of the right to take advantage of a favourable situation to impose such hegemony would be dangerous. The solution must be political and negotiated."
The CP was only reaffirming its orientation. For the CP, the false battle engaged around the the nomination of Vasco Lourenco - even if its dynamic was very dangerous - fell within the general framework of the CP policy of exerting pressure for a recomposition of the Council of the Revolution and the GovernAs for the "revolutionary left', and more precisely the MES and the PRP, they of course caller' for 'armed insurrection' and denounced the 'betrayal' of the CP. Here again, there is The counter-offensive decided on by the commandos of Jaime Neves and supported by the tanks of Salgueiro Maia (commander of the EPC - Practical Cavalry School) won very rapid success. Although this success has allowed the military initiative to pass back into the Government camp, the real scope of this victory must nevertheless be measured Four areas For the moment, the Government is making gains, or trying to make gains, in four 1. The measures of demobilisation of the Military Police (temporary?); changes in the command of various units (RALIS, EPAM Military Police); the return of the reactionary sergeants to the Military Police; arrests of many officers; the removal-resignation of Carvalho, Coutinho and Fabiao - all these moves point in the direction of regaining a grip on the army and of attempting to homogenise the command structures. After the abortive attempt to construct the AMI (Military Intervention Group on the basis of the example of the Amadora commandos, the hierarchy is now seeking to reconstitute a viable intervention force within the army itself, in collaboration with the police forces of the National Guard (GNR) and the Public Service Police (PSP).
2. The nationalisation of Radio Clube Portugues, the handing of Radio Renascenca back to the Catholic Church, and most important, the strict control over the national radio and television station are concretisations of the measures that the Sixth Government has been vainly trying to impose since September These measures reflect a not inconsequential change in the political situation.
Previously, because of the influence of the workers of these radio stations and because of their declared collaboration with the struggles of the working class, the working