One of the key problems facing militants in countries where the population is overwhelmingly agrarian is how to encourage the self-activity masses peasantry and agricultural wage labourers can in general only express themselves as a class through some political form such as the guerilla army.
This is quite unlike the situation in an dovancca Capitalist country, where proletariat can organise itself as a class separate from алесиу ропа forms Southern Africa The New Politics of Revolution Davidson, Slovo and Wilkinson but it nevertheless remains a gigantic one; it is a pity that Basil Davidson did not touch on this aspect of the "new politics, but perhaps his silence is an answer in itself.
Anthony Wilkinson presents a detailed account of the guerilla struggle in Rhodesia which - though very useful in some ways - lacks any assessment of the efficacy of a guerilla strategy in Rhodesia. It would have been a service to militants if he had begun to untangle the complex problem of guerilla strategy in a country where the peasant economy has been effectively destroyed and there is a substantial urban proletariat. He could also have dealt with the tactics involved in guerilla war - namely, whether the participants are concerned with simply exerting pressure to ultimately reformist solution, or whether they are bent on seizing state power, which is an altogether different proposition. This latter problem is that has considerable importance In Tine Republic of South Africa. Guerilla Although there are many things that one can take issue witn in tae work or vaviesor and Wilkinson, there is little arguing with Davidson's defence of guerilla warfare in the former Portuguese colonies. He conClees war u was an essenary comrce! strategy not simply because it was successful, but because the social composition of these countries was primarily agrarian - a proletariat would have been quite useless. In the case of South Africa, however, it is the hasic nremise of the need for guerilla
tics? tion Washington, already ribute to eyes of Callaghan.
ies proposals. time to try to solve the much bigger and harder question of South Africa.
Moreover, we have to stress the key in devising this plot against genuine majority rule in Zimbabwe. It gives the aura of legitimacy which is essential for the selling of the scheme; it is usina to the full the remnants of its political influence among Africans to give the proposals a pinkish tinge. In British officials are discussing American, South African and Rhodesian officials the details of the trust fund. Despite the beleaguered state of the British economy, the Government is to. contthat fund: aid Smith comes before social services in the Finally, what effect will the proposals have? The key element is: will they lead to a downturn in the anti-imperialist struggle? Will the activitNkomos, Muzorewas, Kaundas, Nyereres, etc., cause sufficient confusion and division to defuse the struggle? That is the essence of the question and the real aim of the tions.
Behind this immediate aim and the talk of 'keeping Communism out of RED WEEKLY 30 September 1976 1 mass struggle against it is by definition a social struggle.
But the ending ot Ine guerilla struggle demands cooperation from the so-called front-line states. These bonapartist regimes have to balance between imperialism and the pressure or heir own masses ov incuicine i militant rhetoric, limited aid [with strings] to the armed struggle, and behind-the-scenes deals.
Their much publicised rejection of the terms that Smith outlined is ir keeping with this. The main point is that they have accepted in principle the type of package-deal Callaghar and Kissinger are proposing. Thei desire to aet alteration in the exac! proposals flows from their difficulty in getting the guerillas to agree to end the fighting As Bridget Bloom [based in Salis bury] noted in Monday's Financia Times: The Lusaka communique ap pears to be a tactical move designed to wrench more concessions from the white Government here rather than an attempt to close the door on negotia-