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Newspapers of the International Marxist Group and its forerunners, 1968–1988

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Red Weekly No. 182, 13 January 1977 · pp. 6-7 of the scan · 2,994 words

The scan: rw-no182-jan-13-1977.pdf (PDF, Marxists Internet Archive, opens at this page)

Uncorrected machine reading. This text was read by machine (Apple Vision OCR) from a scan of a newspaper page, and the page was cut into articles by machine, at the headlines found by their type size. Nothing has been corrected: expect misread words, text from a neighbouring article, and titles that are the machine reading of the headline, some of them only fragments. Quote from the scan, not from this page.
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page 6 of the scan

ZANU's establishment followed the banning of a number arenous movemenis - sucias African National Congress 1959. NaTIonal -DenO cratic Party in 1961, and the re0oles Union (ZAPU) in 1962. But what was signiicant about it was une new aspect it introduced into our politics.

This new aspect was to try to define what Zimbabweans could do for themselves, because for long OUT DOlLiCS centred what the United Nations. Britain or Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conferences could do for us.

In defining what we could do for ourselves, what the Africans in Rhodesia could do for themSeIVes. one conclusion correctly arrived at by ZANU -that is. that we are our own liberators. We were trying for the first time in our politics to define that Africans in Rhodesia must take a deliberate decision to find a useful role in the political movement - we wantto put these masses into something which was effectively going to change the system as a whole.

I think na neoeasuna1 constitute the cornerstone ZANU could be summed two slogans: 'We are our own liberators', and Through freedom, through confrontation'. It's a long -TIme since started, but | think that this has oeen ine oniv roae to oe anon What do you consider to be DOLLCEI o eTenees between ZANU and ZAPU? Again, I can only refer vou Dact to the origins of ZANU. Either we cot stalemated in a situatior where we continued to believe that the solution to •UI Situd tion was through Nations or through other international forums, or we made the break that ZANU made started preparing for war.

Later on, however, ZAPU also came to think that fighting was an absolute necessity. It might have been influenced by ZANU and battles ZANU winning; neverne ess rowed the differences tremendously.

other difference course, has been that ZAPU has been built around Nkomo. cannot conceive of ZAPU without Nkomo. This is the sort of thing we rejected WReT formed ZANU. We felt that the organisation mus important than any individual.

There .is a latitude of se criticism that goes on ZANU, and we feel that this is something to be cherished and that this is the oniy way improve upon our performance This is the only way we have many numoers carner on, of these people have been drifting away as they realise that fighting for a country cannot just be cone inrougn an individual o giving support to an individual out inrougn a movement wnicr is prepared to criticise itself and improve upon its performance At present there is OLC POnL uniting ZAPU in Geneva. Do you think nar aner Geneva we to see a united ZANU wert ZAPU?

Unity is something cherish. ZANU would be wrong to avoid unity or any unity, but ZANU has always insisted that unity must be on the basis of principles.

There are many Was the ZANU point of view, which must be corrected before unity can be achieved. Already I have mentioned this hero worshipping of an individual, think such unity could be based individuals, on won't be successful.

But I think that the emphasis that we have stressed is that unity must be forged battlefield that is why insisting that we snoule uniy the army first. People who share of conraeesno wRo Tont toGeLR Up In er, die together, or nazaros or war tooemer. be disunited under any circumstances. that You have recently been in Geneva could you your assessment of the discussions and how you see developing?

I think the one thing the and was of You WE моге inside but say about the liberation movements or the African groupings, they have to some extent succeeded ur ceraciors woule nave ikec to have seen us at each other's Inroats. Inis we nave managed to avoid, and as long as exercise continues we will foi the Patri- low that path ZANU CanG sincieness oi mino in so tara.

we are projecting aspect of a useful solution that Bre-lIKe' and is likely to last.

On the other hand, I think which we everybody now realises in Geneva that the neaotiations nave work against been between the Africans and Mr Ivor Richard, the Chairman.

Smith has not said anything When the sessions resume things, from one particularly question is that of the transfer of power or the demobbing of Smith's soldiers.

Smith is on record we don't that the greater part of his army today is constituted by what he otnerwise it calls non-citizens. I think that Inis is just anomer name To mercenaries. naTs wnly i the there should be no controversy we are over who must police the state of Zimbabwe. Our armed forces have already Smith. Smith has escape the negotiating CannOI he has been on the end of a very bitter fight in which he knows very well that cannot succeed.

SUS have that effect verv conTicent them true people who oaowe tae srетeсоn1е20ь talks At the same time, in not getting divided. to, people who have showing correct ties they have people the Geneva talks?

way better than the important After admitting UDI.

Labour Party and La positive role. we think that The Tiger been fighting only come to table because receiving to fight, witHiHU. ernment If it can we are also that these are role'. can give Zimwe don't interests. •We say welcome to the chairman of the conference; welcome to Great Britain. We hope you will find the solutions.' These words greeted BriTISH ADHOwE Richard on his arrival in an African capital last week. But i was no Pretoria. And it was certainly not Salisbury. These sentiments were expressed by Samora Machel, president revolutionary" bique.

few surprises. regime, to prove so tractable.

Smith, Vorster and Machel.

HALF those who are true Zimbabweans can eventually, if they want after demobbing, apply for and be considered for any post including in the army. But the first task will be to demob these caused SO many atrocities, and some of them might have to be brought to court for some of the atrocidone our Can you give some assessment of the role of the Labour Government in Zimbabwe and in The Labour Government does not seem to us in ZANU in any COnSErV atives. We must remember that UDI was declared with the Labour Government in power, and that it was Wilson who assured Smith that he was not going to send in any army in the event of That was the time when the the Labour Government should have played They abdicated their riaht to do so at the time and Fearless talks were exercises where Smith and be vigilant Wilson talked about the Africans without including them.

It was only after the Africans had taken up arms and started and were seen to be seem to that the Labour Govwanted to salvage some credit for playing what it has often called its 'decoloni- ain's role? But we feel dangers are there, in that their solution will not truly cover our been where have done protection our own.

Things Ine of period?

La militar COURCU He-OuaU! Ivor MozamThe Richard shuttle has provided Vorster COTOIEE CRUX Africa is still reserving judgement on the British proposals for the transition to independence in Zimbabwe, and Smith is sticking to the letter of the supposed Kissinger plan. But no-one expected Machel, the man who called for war against the Smith It is clear to Richard that he has two tough nuts to crack it tne Geneva constitutional conference is to have any hope or success. lat and the Patriotic Front of tional state.

LAPU and LANU nationalist fac tions. To do this he has attempted to put pressure on their closest allies stitutional One half of the plan has already I think we want to continue to and suspicious of whatever else the Labour Government might be up to. They have had the time to show they were our friends, and they siding our enemy far too often for us just to take things for granted.

So what do you see as BritIf in the process of the transfer ot power we can work togetner with Britain to see if among TRose oeooe teere mone nave some less involved in some of these things. then the have the choice of living either under Zimbabwe or going else But this is just the icing on the cake. The bulk of the work involved tiahting and this OUT OWI of Zimbabwe something that we can do on like governor whatever you want to call them 30юc0 oversosereu eee - they carry no more weight.in eroo Towares moowe but they may be convenient to make Britain carry out certain obligations she has over certain DeoDie WHe must DeHee te decide if they want to be a part or cinioaowe So while you would be opISC0 301650.83118 88500 troops, you would be favourable Hoa onisi covemor or ministel defence for a transitional I think whether such a person is OCISOR something my colleagues will nave to discuss in Geneva . But just expressing an opinion, it is Plan' for a single national security divided between ceualy blacks and whites, with a British resident commissioner presiding.

Robert Mugabe, the ZANU leader, could hardly believe his ears: *! am not aware that President Machel has approved a British scheme. . At the moment my information is that he has been given a picture of the present British plan and all he did really was to listen to the proposals."

Mugabe is deceiving himself. The crux of the differences between the nationalist factions - ane berweei the Patriotic Front and Richard - is whetner the counci snould oe majo rity black or divided half and half. Inat is a probiem wnich can D easily resolved, because all the African factions have accepted in principle the presence of a British representative at the head of the transiThe purpose of the Geneva conconference and Richard's present round of talk is to establish the mechanism for an orderlv transition to a neo-colonia state in Zimbabwe. This basic aim is supported by Vorster, who wants the Was stable northern flank which would of no significance what po a single man carries: you c be a general, but you car fight a war without soldiers if the British think that this can Desi carry out their t then it is entirely up to t whom they choose.

In a long term sense, do think that the solution to2 babwe will come through eva or throuch the armed si gle currently being waged? l am rather pessimistic. I cal see Mr Smith accepting thing that comes near to aspirations of our people general, and to that exten would be foolish to think the solution will come ou Geneva. Remember that ZA only went into understanding that it would interfere with our war effort long as it does not interfere v the war, we are quite prepa to expose Smith.

What is the goal of ZANU it a socialist society you w or just a national and demo tic zimbabwe?

ZANU is a nationalist orgar tion. there is no from that; but of all the org sations, ZANU is the one w has a cadre that has go socialist grooming. These believe are the people who continue to politicise the anisation from within, in o enable t to carr socialist programme when Z babwe is won We are not going to make two phases of a democratic socialist revolution, becaus feel that if an occasion v rants that we should carry the two simultaneously border of South Africa It is for this reason that Richard reckons he can count on Vorster's support, just as it was Vorster who persuaded Smith to accept the origi nal Kissinger plan for a two-tier transitiona government in septen ber last year In practice the nationalists and the leaders of the "front-line states"

Zambia, Tanzania MOZamOICUC and Botswana — pose tar less proo lems than Smith himself. The con tradiction between the interests o the white settler capitalists of Rho desia and international capitalism 1 ong standing WAR It was only the intensification o the gueruia war and tne pressure e South Africa and the USA which torced smirn to mare nis amou statement of support for majorit -rule. mis meeung wiwh kicnard Salisbury was 'unproductive', a expected. desnite the aura of triend liness which surrounded the tea and cakes discussion on the lawn Smith's house.

Vorster, who fed Richard with ar impala shot with his own fair hand alLOLCLnCE more COUPCIALY and the presence of willam Ec

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there is no good reason why we should not seize the opportunity and carry out the two.

As• an organisation, ZANU has had to raise the consciousness of the people, and it is carrying that out now, wherever it is fighting, wherever it is touch with the people. Thus the time ZANU presents programme to people because in the final analysis it Is une people or zimbabwe wno "Down with lan Smith is the slogan of hundreds of thousands or Atrican multants must decide - we feel that the people of Zimbabwe will have gone through enough suffering its to make the right choice anc adopt the ZANU socialist programme. Red Weekly is pleased to print the accompanying interview with IGNATIUS CHIGWENDERE, a member of the Publicity Committee of the Zimbabwe African National Union who spent some time in Geneva towards the end of last year.

In printing it we recognise the important role that members of ZANU are playing within the armed struggle led by ZIPA. In their fight against the white racism of the Smith Government in Rhodesia and the presence of imperialism they have our Nevertheless, in extending our support we also reserve the right to make fraternal criticism. It is in this light that we make the following remarks.

The starting point for any socialist in any colonial situation has to be the right of the oppressed peoples to self-determination is, for the people themselves to determine their own future free from the shackles of imperialism. From that point of view comrade Chig wendere and ZANU are correct to stress that the Zimbabwean people are their own liberators, and that one cannot put faith in the United Nations or the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference.

In trying to achieve that goal ZANU also recognises the necessity of the armed struggle. It cannot be denied that it was the stepping up of DEMONSTRATE against all collaboration with apartheid!

Solidaritv with the southern liberation ments!

Sunday 6 March, London.

Called Movement. unconditional support.

- that not only gives moveAnti-Apartheid POSITIVE ROLE? agenda.

possibility.

against imperialism.

THE EDITORS RED WEEKLY 13 January 1976 7 the armed activity of ZIPA and the dangers it held not only for Smith but also for British, South African and American imperialist interests that obliged the leader of the Rhodesian Front to go to the Geneva talks.

In the continuation of this armed struggle the need to unify all the armed organisations to overthrow the Smith regime is a correct objective — as comrade Chigwendere states, 'it would be foolish to think that the solution will come out of Geneva'. Red Weekly has also stressed that the solution to the oppression of the Zimbabwean people will not come from Geneva but from the armed struggle Having agreed with those points, we feel that they are in direct contradiction to ZANU's call for Britain via the Labour Government to assume its role as a 'decolonising power' - for example, by having a governor or ministers in an interim government. All these manoeuvres by the Labour Government in implementing the Kissinger-Callaghan proposals have one clear - to establish a stable neo-colonial regime in Zimbabwe, in which the economic interests of imperialism would be safeguarded even at the expense of those of the national bourgeoisie represented by the Smith Government.

To call for a British Governor to 'carry out certain obligations she has over certain people, as comrade Chigwendere does in the interview, credibility to the neo-colonial solution but also gives the impression that Britain has the right to interfere in Zimbabwe. Red Weekly has opposed all British intervention and demanded that all imperialist concerns should get out of Zimbabwe at once.

During the interview the point is also made in relation to the Labour Government that when UDI was declared in 1965 the Labour Government could have played a 'positive role' by sending in troops. Again such remarks give the impression that Britain has such a right and a positive role to play by its intervention.

Finally, we welcome the comrade's remarks that, 'we are not going to make the two phases of a democratic and a socialist revolution... there is no good reason why we should not seize the opportunity and carry out the two. In the countries of southern Africa it is clear that the African workers and peasants can gain democratic rights only through their own action and the socialist transformation of society.

The white national bourgeoisie is not only tied to imperialism, even though it may have a sharp difference with it, but it also survives precisely. because of the lack of democratic rights for the black masses. For example, low black wages and the high rate of exploitation are not opposed by black trade union organisations. The winning of such rights and the establishment of socialism in all the states of southern Africa is today on the Unfortunately it is clear that ZANU does not have an adequate programme to realise such a Nevertheless, the basis for any defeat of imperialism's plans for southern Africa continues to be the armed struggle of the African people. Red Weekly extends its solidarity to all those who are mounting that fight

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are own

rators' Red Weekly interviews IGNATIUS CHIGWENDERE of the ZANU publicity committee in London

FORA COM IAN SMITH

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