different strategies now resistance comrades of the MIR.
However, the MIR's proposals do have a certain logic, insofar as it is their intention that the militant unity brought about at the base in the *Popular Anti-Gorilla Resistance Movement will determine the real political relationship of forces between the revolutionaries and the reformists. This will be sealed in the nature and direction of the Political Front of the Resistance.
These proposals therefore make sense for the comrades of the MIR. They believe that after the crushing reactionary. Eamonn's criticism adds nothing to our understanding of the problems faced by Connolly, and his references to the need for a revolutionary party merely cover his inability to pose a political solution.
NO REVOLUTIONARY CRITICISM The book fails to make a consistent criticism of the policies of those revolutionaries who helped to set the Irish strupale into motion, but were thrown overboard at the first bend in the road. Bamonn concedes that they failed to understand the national question, and that:
The primary reason why the Provisionals exist is that socialisun as we presented it was shown to be irrelevant. The Provisionals are the inrush which filled the vacuum left by the absence of a socialist option.
Very good, as far as it goes, but with the most radicalised sections of the parties of Popular Unity (in particular the left wing of the Socialist Party and MAPU)-to impose in practice, in the struggle itself, a relationship of forces favourable to the revolutionaries.
It is this perspective which enables comrade Enriquez to state in relation to the 'Popular Anti-Gorilla ResisLance Movement' that it will be on the basis of this, "and of armed detwill be directed towards the defence of the immediate interests of the masses, taking tactical actions of armed propaganda in the countryside and the towns, that it will be possible to build the revolutionary army of the people, the only force capable of taking on the officer corps and the reactionary army, of destroying the dictatorship and opening the way to the proictarian revolution' (Miguel Enriquez-To the workers and revolutionaries of Germany. 20 January 1974).
POLITICAL STRUGGLE The achievement of such a plan requires one thing, however: the political dominance of the revolutionaries in the ranks of the resistance movement and therefore in the Front.
And it is there the problem lies. In the present situation in Chile, where there is an objective basis for the rebirth and development of reformism, militant struggle and the ability of the revolutionaries to take action are not on their own enough to ensure this political dominance.
4 political struggle against the strategy of the reformints-which does not exclude the tactic of a common front -is just as necessary.
The present attitude of the MIR, expressed by Miguel Enriquez in a way which is both ambiguous and contradictory, is therefore both dangerous and mistaken: 'It is not in our interest to focus all our politics around the polemic with the other organisations of the left; the Chilean experience must be a lesson for the peoples of the world."
POLEMIC
Of course it would be wrong for the MIR to concentrate all political nowhere does he outline the policies which revolutionaries ought to have pursued, in the given situation, and the given balance of forces. Instead there is a great deal of 'it might have been' speculation about alternative scenarios.
This when he discusses the effect of the catholic clerical influence in the South after partition in exacerbaling protestant sectatianism in the North, he says:
*No-one was actively canvassing a third alternative, No-one was with equal vigour fighting sectarianism North and South; no-one was acthely supporting and attempting to politicise the economie militancy of Protestant trade unionists and at the same time seeking to destroy clerical conservatism in the South.
"There was no anti-partitionist organi sation which the Protestant (unemployed) rioters of 1932, for example, could have turned to, because there was no anti- revolutionary practice of the MIR, in view of the strategical differences inside the left. the militants of the MIR be able to achments of the parties, whose actions take real advantage of the relationship of forces produced through the united front put forward by the revolutionaries remains unclear and confused; if it is stripped in practice is elevated to become an over-riding against them.
or social democrats-will then be on their own ground. They will be able on to impose as a fact and in action their strategy of an alliance between the classes, alliance with the bourgeois liberal sectors, be able to win a position of complete political dominance inside the Front.
ABSTRACT?
tunately not. The first sign of such a ant since it comes from abroad, can be found very clearly in the second in Rome.
The political "mistakes' in this text, its open as well as implicit thrust, is much closer to the policies Party in its manifesto than it is to those expressed by the MIR in all its a small sign, but it must be recognised as a real and rather alarming one.
are all the more real since in the present situation in Chile, after such a defeat and with its significance for I the cotire world working class, conpartitionist organisation which had put up even a boken fight against the lengthening list of objectively anti-protestant laws in the South, none which had clearty detached itself from bourgeois nationalist policies."
for an immediate solution to the problem of unemployment-unity with catholic workers seemed to be a means of achieving that. But unity was not extended beyond those struggles, and the Northern state was able to break that unity through its institutions.
was bound at first to take a sectarian to these workers. Tevolutioneries should have been considering how to It is for this reason that there must from the start be a clear programmat- clarification. de and organisational definition of the Front, a Front whose class character must be constantly emphasised. Only within this framework, and proceeding from a clear definition of its class character, will the revolutionaries and struggle and a political confrontation.
If on the other hand, the policy of of its revolutionary political content; if the united front, a ractical method.
principle-thenthe dice will be loaded The reformists -be they Stalinists to play on this ambiguity and confusiThey will, thanks to their These are abstract prophecies, the comrades of the MIR will say. Unfordevelopment, though not too significdeclaration of the United Committee expressed by the Chilean Communist declarations since the coup. It is only The dangers of such a development confront each other* PATH TO UNITY But the protestant workers were not looking for an anti-clerical move- propagandist: ment in the South. They were looking Any challenge to the status quo have held together. form. Instead of looking for the clearest non sectarian propaganda initiative such a break would take place in the worst possible conditions for revolutionaries-without a previous political Sue a sace way ponte In such a situation, it would be the reformists who would appear to be the detenders of unity in the struggie against the dictatorshipeven though each day of struggle shows that it is in fact the political line of the reformists which is the principle obstacle to achieving the unity of the Chilean workers.
BASIC QUESTION
This is the basic question facing revolutionary militants today in the task of building the Chilean resistace, in contributing to this debate, we do not pretend to have a solution to what are often extremely complicated tack at problems.
We understand the reasons for this complexity, which is partly produced by the continuing fierceness of the repression and the conditions of work which it imposes. We do not think that this complexity can be made to disappear, as it by a wave of the mogician's wand, simpiy by restating certain fundamental truths. But we do believe that serious dangers exist as a result of the present ambiguity and confusion.
In relation to this, we have a dual perspective. We will continue to tuke part in and contribute to these debates, because that is a vital part of our most elementary internationalist duty As Miguel Enriquez has said, the Chilean experience must be a lesson for the peoples of the world'.
But at the same time, as militants of the solidarity movement with the revolutionary struggle of the Chilean workers, we will do everything possible to ensure that this solidarity is directed towards those who, despite their present ambiguities, are in their basic positions, the best placed today to lead the struggle against the strategy of the reformists.
Because, however much we may criticise their present ambiguities. the MIR stands for the revolutionary road in a situation where, to quote comrade Enriquez once moré, 'two radically different strategies now l attack and weaken these institutions.
McCaan half admits this when he explains that the demands of the civil rights movement for equality in jobs and housing increased sectarianism, because the protestants saw this as an attack on their share, But the conclusions be draws are equally "In terms of strict economics the only programme to undercut sectarianism would have been one which linked the demand for fair distribation of the reberant commodities to demands designed to increase ateolutely the amount of jobs and houses available for distribution •.. If any group had fought consistently ... for such a programme, the all-clus catholic alliance, which is what the civil LUIS MOVEMEnT CERE CUUU DOL And such a progranne, hardly the normal stuf of irish politics, would not have attracted immediate mass support: but it might have enabled those of us in The latest joint declaration issued by Live parties of Popular Unity and the MIR, pablished in Rome on 12 February and teprinled in the 23 March issue of the Communist Party fortnightly Comment, reflects almost entirely the line of the Communist Party. In many places it goes directly agninst the positions which have always been put forward by the MIR, and it is therefore a matter of real concern that the representative of the latter should have signed it.
Thus this declaration, unlike the previous one, starts off with a tribute to te profound and historic change wrought hy the Popular Unity gorernment and that 'consistent revolutionary" Salvados ATHENSIL There is no mention of the past role or furure importance of workers and peas ants' assemblies or committees for struggle at the base. Instead, the whole emphasis is placed on the role of the "popular parties' and the importance of 'restructuring their organisation and One word that does not occur st all in the doclaration la 'socialiser". Far from posing the task of overthrowing the military dictatorship and that of achieving worken power as indissolubly linked, the perspective outlined is simply the patriotic national task of fighting fascism"one which 'many of the military can be expected to join -Indeed, we are told: "Today, all democrata, of whatever ideological, religious or cultaral colour, stand against part to play in isolating, concaining sod defeating fascism', Hence itajor stress is land in the declaration on the need for an alliance with those sections of the capitalist Christian Democracy who have come out in opposition to the policies of the junta. This opposition is analysed not in terms of their present exclusion from the fruits of capitalist rule, but rather as evidence of their democratic, humanitarian conscience"?
Such a policy is of the utmost danger for the working masses of Chile It places the struggle for their interests at the mercy of sections of the capitalist clast who oppose the junta's policies alarming that the representatives of the revolutionary forces in Chile should have had anything to do with it.
- Derry at last to go on talking to Protes tants in the Fountain in 1969.
Eamonn and his comrades set their sights at talking to the Protestant workers-the Provisionals set theirs on smashing the State. That is why they took the leadership of the struggle.
The revolutionary socialists might have led the struggle if they had understood that the contradictions within Ireland posed not simply an opportunity for revolutionary propaganda but an opportunity to lead mass action. And that, despite the lintitations imposed by the objective situation, this action could bring about a much more real hope of working class unity than propaganda ever could.
Unfortunately Famonn's book shows that be still does not underRed Weekly 5 April 1974 Page 5
working class pockets through increased dinert taxes on beer. cirarelies and petrol. Bat the picture isn't much rosier a far as income tos is concerned Those to scil.
our beds, protected hy the grear North Atlantic Treaty and the £3600 million this next year.
these days? A 40% reduction in food prices. An extra 12% acros-tbo-board old agu pension. Or a stake in a great project like perfecting machines that can blow millions of people to pieces at the touch of a button. Whose interests does Lahout's choice serve? good secslist budger