protestant middle class and small capital, and the collusion or benevolent neutrality of the security forces.
In this it contrasted with the strike launched by the Loyalist Association of Workers (LAW) in February 1973 when Whitelaw deliberately provoked and won a trial of strength before the loyalists were ready.
INTIMIDATION The Ulster Workers Council is not a mass organisation, as was LAW. Its membership was built up clandestinely, amongst workers in key jobsmainly in the power stations fAt the of power cuts and massive intimidation to bring most of industry to a hait.
But the British Government made no serious response-the verbal determination of Stan Orme and Merlyn Rees was not matched by Army action against the intimidation. The UWC, which had begun by heing very vague. in its demands, began to be more Insistent in calling for fresh Assembly elections.
AN ENQUIRY has been set up by the Executive of the Transport and General Workers Union into the grievances of the Asian strikers at Imperial Typewriters, Leicester.
When the vicious sectarianism of the strike was underlined by the Dubtalk about the inevitability of troops being sent into the power stations, the UWC immediately pulled back from its threatened complete power shutdown, in order to arrest this threat.
But this temporary faint-heartedstart of the strike it used a combination ness was overcome when the Army failed to give adequate protection to the 'back-to-work" marches, and then when, having acted on orders to dismantle loyalist barricades they watched calmly as they were recrected a few yards away.
WHOLE CARCASE it was not surprising then, that the UWC was not satisfied with the postponement of the Council of Ireland. By that time they wanted not just a pound of flesh but the lin bombings, the newspapers hopan to whole carcase of Sunningdale, This led to the turning point of the crisis. The postponement of the To keep it together, it was de But this immediately met with resistance at the bighest levels of the Army. Top generals told Wison that the Army did not have the capacity to run the power stations. and that such action would require the calling up of the Reserves, a politically disastrous option.
the Government settled for a contingency plan to take over the distribution of petrol. This only escalated the strike, however, and won it the support of the protestant win union enquiry never been.
Council had almost split the Executive cided to move into the power stations In trying to get out of this corner to speak English. resigned. Five months of powersharing, and two years of British planning, vanished as if they bad UNANSWERED QUESTIONS There are still unanswered ques tions. Was it possible for the Army to run the power stations! Was a total shut-down inevitabie, given the fact that the electricity grid in the North is linked with that of the South? Was the Labour Govern!ment's indecision due to a lack of taith in the abdity of the Executive to survive, or pressure fromthe Army? catholic minority.
Two firm conclusions can he drawn. The British Army is only an effective force when used against the catbolic minority, and any action by a British Government, whatever the intentions, cannot seriously change the sectarian nature of the The hapless Paddy Devlin, SDLP Minister for Health and Social Security, who resigned on 17 May but of the Six Counties, at the same tinue was persuaded to 'freezo' this during the crisis, gave vivid evidence of the sectarian bias of the British releases. inertia over sectarian assassinations, and Rees'sintention, without consulting the SDLP, to re activate the Emergency Powers Act, despite commitments by his pre deccessor. Francis Pym, that the opposite would bappen In other words, the Executive was already being undermined by necessary concessions to the Unionists, the State machine, and the British Army who all bave a vested interest in preventing a conflict with the pass of the loyalists, while trying to stamp out the resistance of the Far from vięwing the UWC strike as an example of working class power the British labour movement should take note of the power which the top brass of the Army wielded at a decisive moment in the crisis.
That pover could be used against working class struggles here, and the methods that would be applied were being tested in the catholic ghettoes that the Army was refusing to act against sectarian reaction.
Bob Purdie