THE GROWING RESENTMENT in the Saipon-controlled areas of Vietnat against the regime of President Thieu has now exploded into mass opposition.
Over 2,000 people demonstrated against him in Saigon on 31 October; 500 attended the funeral on 11 Nowember of a 17-year-old killed at a previous rally: journalists have demonstrated against the Press Laws; in the coastal provinces the lawyers simply refuse to prosecute under the Tepressive legislation; even in the rigged National Assembly, 50 deputies have signed a petition calling for Thieu's resignation. Almost every day now there is a rally or mass meeting somewhere in South Vietnam in apposition to the regime, SOCIAL CRISIS The opposition still concentrates on Anti-Thieu demonstrator in Saigon protests as police move in to break up a recent rally organised by the Buddhist National Reconciliation Forces are to be found in the deep social crisis of the regime ian. increasing repression and, of course, the continuing toll of the war. To many, the conparison betapen their situation and that of theit compatriots in North armed foross is well known. The South adily beaten back trom many of their Brons are now permanently grounded boo ground the artillery corps now have only sto 1 supetionty in wespons over th NLF guncers and inore accurate.
the NLF. This continuing toll has had a TWO GROUPS tion Porces Paris Accorde TENSIONS the question of corraption; but the underlying causes of the present mobilisation reflectod in massive unem ployment, chronie sickness and malnutritthe hureauerncy working class of Saipon Vietnam is becoming increasingly relevant.
Un top of this, the plight of Thieu's Vietnamese arnty (ARVN) have been stebases until they are now incapable of even keeping the roads oper Ton bomber squad nuse of lock of fuel and lechnicians. On the NLF (it was 10 to 1 a ycar apo) —and the In an average week, 2,000 ARN troops are killed or captured and 4,000 desert. to deep impact in the cities; and the widely held opinion that the NIF would easily win In a straight military fight has played a large part in galvanising the opposition into action -both from the right and the It is very important to be clear about the nature of the urhan opposition. Leaving aside the vacillating opposition from right-wing bureaucrats and army officers. the mass movement is organised in two proupings: the loople's Anti-Corruption Movement and the National Reconcilis The PACM is predominantly Cutholic, although it also has the support of the Cao Dai ta military-relipious sect which in curlier days acted as a mercenary army for the French 1. Its leader, Tran Hau Thanh, is openly anti-connunist: his Line is that Thieu should he replaced by someone better able to deal with the The NRF, on thie other hand, is ore anised around the militant Buddhist An Quang Papoda, which played a large part in the mobilisations against President Diem in the carly 1960k Although st takes a 'neutral position towards the NLE, it is explicitly opposed to imperinlist Intervention in Vietnam, and has also Jargely absorbed the programme of the Committee for the Implomentation of the The PAC'M aod NRE wark klosely together, but grave tensions have already emergod retlecting deir diltereot social and class hases. While the PACM is firmly rooted in the privileged Catholic hierarchy and -layers which until rocenHE COSHEEN CUEUS MEDESE is based on the predominantly Buddhist This latter has strong traditions of trade union organisation, militancy, and anti-impcralist struggle. Furthermore, it is the soc Bon of the urban population which has the strongest links with the NIF (both tradittomals and at the presen. Mus those two organisations, althouch both contain left and right wing ciments, are pradually crystallising the opposition along class Lite Both organisations will ultimately have to choose between allying themselves with the impenalists or with the NLE -00 midde way is bosse Gven be dranal! leftward shift of the urban masses the fears would pretor to ally itsell with Thieu Red Weekly rather than see the NRE grow are prob. ably quite justified.
THIEU'S RESPONSE Because of the contused nature of the opposition, Thieu's response to it has been very mixed. At first he went very goutly. afraid of alienating his base among the Cathols chen ioore. A Mumber DE coDo estions were made, including the removal of 400 arnty officers and several Govemment Ministers.
However it soon became clear that this would not satisfy the opposition, and so a new wave of regression was launched The Saigon demonstration of 31 Oclober was viciously attacked by riot police sparking off a battle which lasted for more than three bours, Journalists' clubs up. But this simply added fuel to the flames, so now Thieu has cured back once mote to a policy of ratraint. Although all rallies are covered hy armed police there have been fewer attempts to stop Ween taKing place.
ACUTE PROBLEMS The probiem for imperialism is still more acute. Maty of the imperialists (including The Times) would Like to see Thieu replaced by someone more pliable presentable, and 'reasonable' However there is no one person who could replace Thieu and still he strong enough to hold South Vietnam safe for imperialism, It is quite clear that it Thou is deposed, his remoral will give the urban masses zilded confidence in their own Eink-up betwoon the NLF and the urban strugale, with disastrous resuts for imp erism On the other band it hueu i kept in power then the opposition will probably continue to grow, and the masse will begin to look more and tone to the NEF for leadership - particularly if the NET contnues to gaim in StrencED 86 1 has been doing recently The growing pace of developments in South Vietnam makes it all the more unportant for militants in this country to add their weisht to the intematiana de mand Jor the overthrow of Thic and at the same time strengthen the potition of the NLF by demanding that the Labour Government recognises the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South David Johnson 5 December 1974
WEEKLY THE DELEGATES at the National Union of Students' Conference at