sonary marxists in relation to the present leaderships of the working class, it will be impossible to impose on the mass organisations centralised united fronts on a wide programme of demands. Usually only united action around specific questions on a partial and short-term basis will be possible. It is through the fight to build united front action committees around specific issues and struggles that revolutionary marxists can begin to turn the balance of forces within the workers' movement against the bureaucratic leadarships and in favour of those breaking from the general political line of the bureaucracy, the new mass vanguard. Through such a process MARR Red Weekly 27 February 1075 Page 8 the possibility of forcing unity with sections of the mass organisations on aspects of our programme will become possible. Within this strategic framework propaganda blocs -even with other small revclutionary groups have a relevance. But such blocs are not the aim, but a meens lo our strategie goal.
It is for this reason that even where we engage in united fronts of vanguard organisations the IMG fights for these to extend their activity on particular issues to create united initiatives in action with sections of the workers" movement. Thus, on Ireland, we call for the Troops Out Movement to organise its main demonstrations through ad hoc mobilising committees and ERNATIO call for its conferences of the labour movement to be organised on the same basis. Similarly, we urge the setting up of local campaigns for the Working Women's Charter while fighting for wider based action on more limited demandssuch as agrinst White's anti-abortion Bill, or in support of the recent strike at Salford Electrical Instrumcats. These are precisely the lactics we are forced to adopt in the prosent relation of forces in order to force action by sections of the mass organisations around aspects of our programme 4. Our strategic line, under pro sent conditions, demands a systemate attempt to gain united action with left social democracy, The expVI GROUP ment in 1945 or 1964. will lead a vanguard to break from the Labour Party, but social democracy will continue to exercise political domination over the masses. Specifically, the most militant layers of the masses remain in the hands of left social democracy. However while, in particular, the organising cadre of the trade union movement at a local level -factory convenors, shop stewards consmittees, ete are not prepared to make a clear political break from Labour, they have been increasingly prepared since the mid-1960s to act outside of the framework of -or against the line of- the Labour Party Thus in 1974 Labour was unable to got several crucial working class struggles called off -the miners in February, the AUEW acainst the NIRC in May, Ford's in October, Already under the previous Labour Government the struggle against In Place of Strife showed the increased willingness of parts of the working class to take action agrinst the line of a Labour Government. Unlike 1945 or 1964, the return of the present Labour Government has not led to a downturn in the industhal Struggie. Furthermore, the involvement of left social democratic forces in campaiges over Chile and the Shrewsbury pickets would havg been inconceivable on the heels of the election of a Labour GovernIt is this increasing willinguess to act outside of and against the line of the labour leadership that opens the way for the building of ment, united front action in defonce of the interests of the working class. The conscruction of united fronts between these layers and the forces of the new mass vanguard has proved already to be-the most elfeclive instrument for building political action on the issues of Chile Shrewsbury, the scruggle against private praclice in medicine, the Working Women's Charter, the Conmon Market, and so on. It will be even more crucial in the struggle against unemployment and the construction of a revolutionary trade union tendency 5. It is differences over these questions of the trunsitional progr amme and the united front, and con sequently on the strategic line of the TMG. which underlie all the con crete differences with Tendency A.
In our view, for Tendency A the transitional programme is esentially reduced to an action prog ramme whose function is to allow the formation of propaganda bloca with, and eventual regroupment of, vurious rovolutionary and centrist currenis. Purallel to this is an app arcut concept of the united iront not primarily as a problem in relation to the mass organisations of the working class, but as a tactic aimed at forming propaganda bloss with and regrouping the political vanguard. For this latter reason also. united fronts seem to be essentially posed as outside of alliances with left social democracy The net result of these false analyses is confusion. We are given tips on organising the vauguard, the need to regroup the far left, what to do after the creation of organs of dual power and so on, but absolutely Do answer on what should be the strategic line of the organisation. If It should still be for the creation of organs of, dual power, chen Tendency A gives no indication of what are the decisive links beading in that direction under the present Labour GovernTo the extent that the comrades do attempt to put forward any strategic line, for example *breaking Labour's monopoly of politica. representation, it may or may not be the best obe trom the point of view of organising the vanguard, but it is absolutely nor a strategic line for the class struggle As a result of this lack or a teal stratepc axis, Tendency A's position is like a flasby car without a steering wheel- it has dozens of marvellous padgets, but no-one knows what direction it is poine in