into Saigon are in the hands of the liberation forces.
Although the mullitary situation remains fluid, certain things are clear. The main military strategy of the People's Armed National Liberation Front (PALNF) has been-and still isto smash the South Vietnamese armies (ARVN) both numerically and in terins of morale. The fruits of this strategy were the victories of the last few months.
Two major tactics have been adopted in this strategy. The first has been to destroy ammunition dumps and airfields, thereby limiting the fighting abusty of the ARVN. The second tactic has been the encirclement of particular ARVN bases. The isolated bases have then either been wot down by the liberation army or they have been used to lure ARVN reinforcements befose being attacked.
BOGGED DOWN
It was the second tactic which was used so successfully at Xuan Loc. After most of the original garrison had been wiped out, Thieu was forced to send in the Est Airborne Divisionthe absolute elite of the ARVN army. This bogged down his best troops at Xuan Loc, denying them the ability to take any initiatives of their own and ensuring that they were unable to reinforce the defence perimeter elsewhere.
Meanwhile the PANLF forces bypassed the isolated Xuan Loc and headed lowards the key air base of Bien Hoa, 14 miles north-cast of Saigon, Now the puppet government has been forced to move half its air strike force from Bien Hoa leaving behind the aircraft repair shops.
BALANCE OF FORCES
As yet, however, the balance of forces between the two sides is not clear cut. The puppet government has at its disposal the best part of seven divisions clustered around Saigon, all armed with modern up-to-date weaponry. Most of these troops are fresh and have the backing of a buge airborne force.
But although the planes, tanks and helicopters are there it is not known how many are usable. For inscance, only one quarter of the giant Chinook gunships are fit to fy. Over the last Tew years the servicing of planes and tanks has been carried out almost entirely by US personnel. Most of the Americans have now left, and it is Jughly probable therefore that the technical backbone of the ARVN will now be unuseable.
Above all, the question of morale is most important and this is known to be very low. The ARVN troops have never won a decisive battle, und are genuinely afraid of the "invincible' communists They can have little or In comparison the PANLF has committed very little forces to the fighting. Most of the battles in the last few weeks have been carried out by regional units of the PANLF. They have used up bittle ammunition and have had to do comparatively little fighting. The regular units of the North Vietnamese divisions around Saigon are still fresh and well-equipped Although the arms of the liberation army are inferior to the ARVN, they certainly use them to better effect. They are also able to use captured US arms. Long-range 130mm howitzers are now in position around Saigon, and the airport at bien Hoa could soon be made completely unusable.
How long the ARVN will beable to hold back the insurgents will be determined by two key factors. Firstly there is the ability of the PRG to develop an insurrectionary situation inside Saigon it is known that there has been a big infiltration of political cadre and sappers into the city. Then there is the mood of the ARVN, and even reportets from the capitalist media are forced to report on the despair and pessimism that is swerping through Saigon.
The PRG often liken the pupper regime to a rotten appic on a tree. All i needs now is a well-aimed blow and this could well come from within the city armed and Vietnamicse revolution (thanks to the Chines and Russin bureameracres) Shov held this to be very important. Of much euphasis on the withdrawal of all US intercation -a key step und as such servod an a focus for Die activity of the developing opposition in the zones held by the puppet regime (GVNI of the Thieu regime. They stated that We therefore do not support the mese CP and will disarm politically the workers and peasants pose to this the formation of workers revolutionary masses which should bo all levels. Hut althouch we dissers with
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THE SAIGON PUPPET GOVERNMENT is now confined to a zone of about 15-30 miles around the capital of Saigon and a few scattered areas in the Mekong Delta. Most of the roads leading