was the widespread feeling of the need for change. It was another twenty years before that change was realised, and the mines were nanonansea. ine reason being that the feeling required political consummation, and the leadership necessary to achieve this was absent. The feeling which underlay the Miners (unofficial) strike last October is also a Ieeling which beckons change. The strike gained the largest pay increase since nationalisation, and a reduction in surface workers' hours. Consequently the members are beginning to appreciate that militancy pays, when effectively trected. In their long history the NUM has never sought to use, to learn, and to lead its members in militancy. So the members used, taught and led their "leaders".
At their annual conference on the Isle of Wight the rank and file delegates continued to instruct their leaders in the lessons of their Jetober. The feeling generated in 1969 ha immered since and in 1970 should mature in he Conference called for substantia Na osition from the NEC increases to be backed by industrial action. The pay demand of more than 30% would increase the minimum pay to E20 for surface workers, E22 for underground workers, and £30 for face worners, Une delegate said tnat il the demand was not met, "it will unleash an anger that will make last October seem like a Sunday School picnie.
Changing Structures and Changing Attitudes t the future. The current pay demand, and th rike last October, should be seen in terms o the changing structure and nature of mining. It should also be seen in terms of a changing atti. tude on the part of the membership towards Te NUME The changing nature of mining, or "rationalisation" as it is called, has involved three distinet elements. In the first place the closure f ""uneconomie" pits. Or to b correct the :losure of the smallest units and those tha oresencec alcues in mecnanısın here has been the concentration of the . Thus largest units and their mechanisation. In 1950 only 1% of total output was the product of mechanisation. In 1969 the total was 91%. The corollary being the reduction of manpower needed, and often the destruction of regions and communities (Scotland, the North-East, and Wales in particular, but not exclusivelv so).
day and 168 hours in a week. At collieries in Nottinghamshire the rotating seven-day-week was introduced. The rest of the industry has so far resisted this, but has experienced the two, three, or four shift system. "Between March 1965 and March 1966 the number of longwall faces working 3 or 4 shifts increased by 18%.
Between March 1966 and March 1967, the first year of the new agreement, the increase was dU0Ul Sie. '(1) (The new agreement was the NPLA). In March 1968 there was a total of 1,195 longwall machines working, 989 or 83% of which were utilised on two or more shifts. In March 1969 out of a total of 998 longwall machines, 841 or 84% were engaged in multishift utilisation.
The third fature has been the continuing process of concentrated machine use during shift time. This was achieved primarily by interchangeabeity in the NPLA. (See Fr. Heaing interchangeability in the NPLA. (See R. article in Trade Union Register 1969). The increased supervision is observable in the changing ratio of officials to men. In the Nort! Derbyshire area, for example, the ratio of officials to workers increased from 1:12 in June 1967 to 1:9.5 in July 1968. At the coal face the ratio is nearer 1:6, which is a degree of control and supervision unprecedented even in the motorcar industry.
The N.U.M. Conciliationists The role of the NUM since its formation, which covers the period of nationalisation, has been a conciliatory one. Its role during the period of is transformation has been one which would bring blushes to any innocent's ace. This was recognised by the NCB in th following words: Despite the heavy çlosur programme and the high rate of manpower rundown in recent years, the Board have, by close cooperation with the Unions, maintaining good industrial relations, avoided major industrial disputes and made continued progress in reducing the tonnage lost from disputes." (NCB Report and Accounts, 1968/69, Vol. 1, p.1.) In the years 1966-67, 1967-68 and 1968-69, there were losses due to strikes of 2.26 million tons out ot a total output of 480.1 million ons, equivalent to less than 0.5% of output here has been less time lost in disputes thar through sickness and injury.
It is L. Daly who, as General Secretary of the NUM, is primarily confronted with the problem of a discredited union. A problem he was well aware of before taking office, when he said: "...and if we continue to accept the Coal Bord's rejection of even the most moderate demands (for example, the 40-hour week for surface workers) we become ineffective and The U.S. farm workers have recently won a earlier point, the gains after October 1969 by industrial action were the highest pay increase since Nationalisation and during the history of the NUM.
The past ten years, and in particular the past five years, have created a climate of "no confidence " in the industry. A climate which is intensified when viewed in the perspective of projections up to 1975. The crisis is readily observable in the steadily increasing average age of those employed in mining, and in the failure of the NCB to control the manpower rundown.
In 1960 the recruitment level was 42,400; in 1969 it had fallen to 18,900, a fall of 23,500 A level insufficient to set off natural wastage In the coal fields of the Midlands there are jobs waiting for men; in Scotland, the North-East and South Wales, there are miners wanting jobs.
HO MIU CCUHS LUL buc nexe uve wearsar embodied in a Government White Paper of 1967, which says that by 1971 output would meet a demand of 155 million tons per year and the manpower required would be 275,000. By 1975 the demand would be 120 million tons and the manpower requirements 160,000. The actual output in the year up to March 1969 was 153 million tons, which was 2 million tons below a target two years in the future. It was achieved by a manpower of 340,000, which was 65,000 more than the 1971 estimates. This was chieved by an Oms (Output per man shift) of 2.5 cwt. Therefore in order to achieve th 1971 estimates, a minimum Oms of 70 cwt. would be required, and to reach the 1975 estimates an Oms of 75 cwt. The fear at the present time is that the manpower rundown may outpace productivity gains, in which case a more realistic estimate for 1975 may be 80 million ton per year.
A Robens-Daly Pact?
At the centre of the crisis is the failure of the NCB as an employer to pay a wage commen surate with the job. With higher paid jobs available, men are not prepared to waste any ppportunities they may be offered of leaving hose most reluctant to leave are in the 40-6 ge group, as they would lose their acum ted benefits. Those who are leaving are thos on whom the industry would rely in the future. It is important, therefore, that the current wage claim is successful to maintain and attract young labour. It is for this end and no other reason that Robens has appeared to defend the claim made by the miners. It is in this context that the central contradiction of the current situation is that only a Union, with the confidence of its membership, which is pursuing the largest wage demand in its history, could save the coal industr from collapse.
The failure of the Union in the current wag claim would confirm that the NUM was "inef 'fectiye and discredited as a Union." The men would have little or no confidence in the NUM and the Union would deserve none. It would confirm to the NCB and the Government that the Union could not withstand even more ferocious blows being dealt to the miner and his community than have been delivered in the past. In which case the exodus from the mines would render even 80 million tons a year the wildest dream.
A successfully executed campaign by the Union without industrial action (assisted by the NCB) would tend to breathe artificial life into the old forms of negotiation. It would re-estab lish the credibility of the Union and slow down the exodus of manpower (to the relief of the NCB). However, it should be realised that the claim is for a 30% increase, and the mines are in the publie sector (so-called) of the economy. To the disdain of Robens, the Government expect him to refuse the increase. "Mr. Barber said nationalised industry chairmen ought to resist even io her stand laos ked a state interest, even if their stand provoked a strike.
Times, Thursday August 13 1970).
It does therefore appear as though the Union's 30% wage claim will force it into its first industrial in its history. The membership gained a valuable lesson last October and are pressurising the Union from below. We must not, however, assume that a strike is on until the men are drawing strike pay. Should the claim be refused then the Union E.C. would not call a strike. They would "consult the membership" The annual conference decision commits the NEC, in accordance with the Union rules.
So that, although this leaves a great many opportunities for bureaucratic manipulation, if a strike is called in the meantime it would be difficult for the NUM to avoid supporting it The NUM officials will try every ploy they know to avoid industrial action. Even the sabrerattling used by the T&GWU in the recent dock strike would normally be too much for them.
With the rank and file breathing down their neck, they may think it sufficient to buy off the militancy. It would be a wrong caleulation:
hey eres end be hay and they have had more than negotiations. As in 1926 change is the order of the day. Only this time there is not twenty years to wait.
Malcolm Ball (1)
Year Man OUT No. of Oms.t power put* collieries Jan. 1950 690,000 200.7 23.4 Jan. 1960 624,000 192.5 26.9 March 1969 | 340,000 153.0 142.0 * In million tons tIn cwts.
JONES THE MILITANT In Wales the good solid name of Jones is so common that the various Jones's are known by their professions, e.g. Jones the Milk, Jones the Bread, etc. The national press of Sunday September. 6th is full of comments by Jones the Militant (Jack Jones, Gen. Sec. TGWU) expressing surprise at the Tories' proposed "provocative use of troops in the impending municipal workers' strike. Surely Jack Jones with his vast experience of trade union matters must be aware that not only will the present Tory Gov ernment be as provocative as possible, but they will use every means in their power to smash militant trade unionism, including press, television, police, troops, and if necessary, fascist thugs.
Brother Jones, our leaders at Westminster Gas works, popularly known as the House of Commons, are fully aware and confident that despite your loud militant noises, should our brothers in khaki be used in strike-breaking activity, you will do nothing but make louder noises. You and your fellows at the TUC sold the seamen out in 1966, you have reneged on the dockers many times, and you swallowed the lot in the recent dock strike. All you and your Cde Hugh Scanlon have to do is to tell the bunch of Old Etonians in the Cabinet that any more attacks on working class conditions, work practices and wages, will be met by a national transport strike; in their own words, "Action not Words! You may fool some of the trade union movement with your empty threats, but your rubbish won't wash with socialists, Mr. Jones.
whom cited the Pilkingtop example, and was defeated by a margin of about 20-1.
It is clear that there is a rapidly developing movement in the EPTU to democratise the union, kick out Cannon & Co., and begin to fight the employers again. All revolutionaries have a duty to give any support they can. The EPTU is regarded by many sectors of the ruling class as a "model" union-an example of "constructive" trade unionism. A victory for the militants here would be a victory for the whole working class -Red Clydeside Moles The Red Mole 15th September 1970 Page 3
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R. Heath: T/U Register 1969, p.189-191. L. Daly: The Miners and the Nation, p.13